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An Employer's Duty to Accommodate





Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' proscribes discrimina-
tion in employment on the basis of an individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin.2 The original version of the Act defined
* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School; A.B. 1950, Harvard University; J.D.
1966, John Marshall Law School.
** B.A. 1975, M.S.W. 1977, Ohio State University; J.D. 1981, John Marshall Law
School; Attorney at Law, Chicago, Illinois; Illinois Bar Foundation Research Fellow 1980-81.
The authors express their appreciation to Professor Ingram's former Research Assistant,
Paula Giroux, now an Assistant Attorney General, State of Illinois, for her invaluable assist-
ance in the editing and revision of this article. Ms. Giroux was an Illinois Bar Foundation
Research Fellow in 1981-82.
The authors also express their appreciation to Professor Ingram's present Research Assist-
ants, Sandra L. Freeman, Bonnie Harris, Sandra Freeman Kravitt, and Marybeth Shumar for
their capable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Tit. VII, §§ 701-16(c), 78 Stat. 253
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-15 (1970), amendedby 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp.
IV 1974)) [hereinafter cited as The Actl.
2. The Act, supra note 1, provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
Writers generally acknowledged that the primary purpose of Title VII consisted of
eliminating racial discrimination in employment. See, e.g., Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Dis-
crimination and the Role ofArbitration Under Title VII, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 599, 599-600 (197 1);
Developments in the Law - Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Ac, of
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113-14 (1971). Other categories of discrimination, however,
have also received judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976) (denial of pregnancy benefits not discrimination on basis of sex); Espinoza v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (refusal to hire a non-U.S. citizen not discrimination on basis of
national origin); Ochoa v. Monsanto Co., 473 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1973) (company's hiring prac-
tices not discrimination on basis of national origin); Morris v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 387 F. Supp.
1232 (M.D. La. 1975) (hair length regulation not discrimination on basis of sex).
The legislature included religion as a prohibited criterion for discrimination in Title VII
partially because the Civil Rights Act parallels state fair employment practices legislation,
which typically prohibits religious discrimination. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001
neither "religion" nor "discrimination." In 1966, however, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)3  issued
guidelines to clarify the meaning of the statute.4 These original
guidelines allowed an employer to establish a normal work schedule
regardless of the impact it had on the religious observances of some
employees.5 A year later, the EEOC issued new guidelines 6 that re-
quired an employer to make reasonable accommodations to the reli-
gious needs of employees unless such accommodations would cause
undue hardship to the employer.7 The guidelines did not define
either "reasonable accommodation" or "undue hardship," but left
their interpretation to the EEOC's review of each case to facilitate an
equitable application of the guidelines to the variety of situations
(198 1); OR. REV. STAT. § 659-030 (1981). The inclusion also reflects a recognition of religious
freedom as a fundamental right in American society.
Religion differs from the other discriminatory criteria in that it is not immutable. Unlike
race, color, and national origin, which never change, or sex, which usually does not change,
people often change their religion, either by outright conversion, e.g., Claybaugh v. Pacific
Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. I (D. Ore. 1973), or by a growing conviction within their
present faith, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd,
429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), a'dper curiam by an equally di'ided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
3. Responsibility for the administration of Title VII falls upon the EEOC. The EEOC's
authority enables it to receive charges of discrimination, to investigate such charges, and, when
it has reasonable cause to believe a charge, to attempt to eliminate the alleged discriminatory
employment practice by informal conciliation and persuasion. If conciliation fails, the charg-
ing party may sue in Federal district court.
4. The 1966 guidelines state in part:
[Tihe duty not to discriminate on religious grounds includes an obligation on the part
of the employer to accommodate to the reasonable religious needs of employees and
. . .prospective employees where such accommodation can be made without serious
inconvenience to the conduct of the business. However . . . an employer is free
under Title VII to establish a normal work week generally applicable to all employ-
ees, notwithstanding that this schedule may not operate with uniformity in its effect
upon the religious observances of his employees.
31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966).
5. Id
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1981).
7. Guidelines for observation of the Sabbath and other religious holidays consist of the
following:
(a) Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the question whether
it is discrimination on account of religion to discharge or refuse to hire employees
who regularly observe Friday evening and Saturday, or some other day of the week,
as the Sabbath or who observe certain special religious holidays during the year and,
as a consequence, do not work on such days.
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds,
required by section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an obligation
on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious
needs of employees and prospective employees where such accommodations can be
made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. Such un-
due hardship, for example, may exist where the employee's needed work cannot be
performed by another employee of substantially similar qualifications during the pe-
riod of absence of the Sabbath observer.
(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to hire an
employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer has the bur-
den of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accommodations to the
religious needs of the employee unreasonable.
(d) The Commission will review each case on an individual basis in an effort to
seek an equitable application of these guidelines to the variety of situations which
arise due to the various religious practices of the American people.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1980).
that could arise due to the varied religious practices of the American
people.8
Judicial opinions questioned the validity of the EEOC's new in-
terpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Critics argued that the
guidelines conflicted with the purpose of the Act because Congress
had intended to regulate only discriminatory practices, and failure to
make accommodations did not constitute a discriminatory practice. 9
Congress clarified its intention in 1972 when it added the following
definition to the 1964 Act: "(j) The term 'religion' includes all as-
pects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate
to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business."'°
The potential impact of this section is substantial. The defini-
tion may force an employer to renegotiate a union contract that re-
quires scheduling a worker for days to which he objects on religious
grounds." It may further require an employer to violate a labor
contract by assigning more senior employees to Saturday work.
12
The broad language protecting "all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief' may encompass employees who ob-
ject to making particular products, to shaving, or to joining a union
in a closed shop.' 3 The validity and effect of this requirement there-
fore concerns all employers.
This article will first review the steps leading to congressional
adoption of the "reasonable accommodation" requirement, and will
then examine the ways in which failure to accommodate an em-
ployee may interfere with his free exercise of religion as protected by
the first amendment.' 4 The article next examines the following prin-
cipal areas in which an employee's religious beliefs may conflict with
an employer's rules and procedures: (1) observance of the Sabbath;
(2) religious requirements regarding appearance and attire; (3) reli-
gious prohibitions relating to food, innoculations, etc.; and (4) reli-
gious scruples antithetical to union membership. After discussing
the extent to which an employer must "accommodate" an em-
ployee's religious needs, and what constitutes "undue hardship" to
8. Id See Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2, for a discussion of the problems existing
prior to the 1972 amendment to Title VII with emphasis on arbitration problems.
9. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 1970) (dictum), af'dby an
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); see Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D.
Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. 11 1976), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
II. See Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. I (D. Or. 1973).
12. See Scott v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1030 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
13. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 559 (6th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I states in part: "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion]."
the employer,' 5 the article considers whether the "reasonable accom-
modation" requirement constitutes an "establishment of religion" in
violation of the first amendment.' 6
II. The Statutory Requirement
4. Development of the Statutory Reasonable
Accommodation Requirement
In 1970, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company 17 presented the
first challenge to the accommodation rule of the 1967 EEOC guide-
lines. In Dewey, plaintiff-employee was discharged for refusing to
work on Sunday, his Sabbath. He alleged that his discharge violated
Title VII. Defendant-employer asserted that it had acted in compli-
ance with a collective bargaining agreement requiring all employees
to perform all work required of them by the company, and further,
that the company had permitted Dewey to find a substitute for his
Sunday work. 8
The trial court found for plaintiff, stating that the company had
failed to reasonably accommodate Dewey's needs.' 9 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the 1967
guidelines were not in force at the time of Dewey's discharge. It
further stated that even if the guidelines had been effective, defend-
ant had reasonably accommodated Dewey by allowing him to find a
substitute.20 The court also cast doubt on the validity of the guide-
lines in light of the first amendment. "It is settled that the govern-
ment in its relations with religious believers and non-believers, must
be neutral. The government is without power to support, assist,
favor or handicap any religion."'" The Supreme Court of the United
States affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision without opinion.22
In response to Dewey, Congress amended Title VI1 3 to incorpo-
15. The discussion of undue hardship will include the effect of a union contract. See
infra notes 182-207 and accompanying text.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I states in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion ...."
17. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), af]d by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
18. Plaintiff-employee, however, also asserted that his religion barred him from asking
someone else to work in his place.
19. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709, 711 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd, 429
F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); accord Jackson
v. Veri Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. La. 1969).
20. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally di-
vided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
21. Id at 334-35.
22. Because the Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided Court, the decision is not
"entitled to precedential weight." Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972).
23. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. IV
1974) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970)). One Senator remarked:
This amendment is intended, in good purpose, to resolve by legislation - and in a
way I think was originally intended by the Civil Rights Act - that which the courts
apparently have not resolved. I think it is needed not only because court decisions
rate the 1967 EEOC guidelines.24 The amendment primarily sought
to add enforcement procedures to Title VII, but also included a pro-
vision later known as the Randolph Amendment.2 The Randolph
Amendment defined religion as including all aspects of observance
and practice and required that an employer demonstrate that he
could not accommodate an employee's religious practices without
undue hardship.26 Unfortunately, the 1972 amendment, like the
1967 guidelines, failed to define "reasonable accommodation" or
"undue hardship." Consequently, lower courts still confronted the
task of applying reasonable accommodation standards and deciding
which accommodations would cause undue hardship to the em-
ployer. The resulting case-by-case analysis has provided meaning
and scope to the accommodation rule.
B. What is "'Religion"?
Title VII's proscription against religious discrimination in em-
ployment presupposes the existence of "religion" 27 without really de-
fining it. 28  Although most religious discrimination in employment
cases involve organizations clearly recognized as religious in nature,
in some instances the EEOC or the courts have had to initially assess
whether the alleged discrimination involved a "religion" or a "reli-
gious observance or practice," or whether the discrimination
stemmed from prejudice of a different kind, such as dislike of the
person's political or philosophical views. 29  Much dispute has re-
volved around the question whether the Civil Rights Act affords pro-
have clouded the matter with some uncertainty; I think this is an appropriate time for
the Senate, and hopefully the Congress of the United States to go back, as it were, to
what the Founding Fathers intended. The complexity of our industrial life, the tran-
sition of our whole area of employment, of course are matters that were not always
understood by those who led our Nation in earlier days.
118 CONG. REC. 705-06 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
24. The legislative history of the amendment reveals the following congressional ap-
proval of the guidelines pertaining to religious discrimination that EEOC had previously
adopted: "The purpose of this subsection (Section 7010)) is to provide the statutory basis for
EEOC to formulate guidelines on discrimination because of religion such as those challenged
in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company... " 118 CONG. REC. 7564 (1972).
25. The amendment derived its name from Senator Randolph, the sponsor of the aspect
of the amendment that dealt with religion.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000eoj) (Supp. IV 1974).
27. There have been many notable attempts to erect a workable constitutional standard
for defining religion. See, e.g., Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution.- A Classification
Problem, II VAL. U. L. REV. 163 (1977); Boyan, Defining Religion in Operational and Institu-
tional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968); Clark, Guidelines/or the Free Exercise Clause, 83
HARV. L. REV. 327 (1969); Killilea, Standards/or Expanding Freedom of Conscience, 34 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 531 (1973); Rabin, Wen Is a Religions BeliefReligious. United States v. Seeger
and the Scope ofFree Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 231 (1966).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. IV 1974) does provide that the "term 'religion' includes
all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief..."
29. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1973) (plaintiff
allegedly discharged because of membership in United Klans of America; court held that ra-
cist and anti-semitic ideology of that organization has a "temporal and political character in-
consistent with the meaning of 'religion' as used in" the Civil Rights Act).
tection only to beliefs, practices, and observances of orthodox and
traditional religious groups, or whether the protection extends to any
"religion," however unorthodox, mistaken, or incomprehensible the
average person might find it.
The Founding Fathers and, originally, the Supreme Court con-
ceived of religion almost exclusively in terms of traditional religious
concepts.3" While the intentions of those who drafted and adopted
the religion clauses remain unclear, certain known historical circum-
stances surrounding the genesis of the clauses suggest the aims of the
framers. 31 Contemporaneous documents indicate that "religion" im-
plied at least theism, and little doubt exists that to the framers' "reli-
gion" entailed a relationship of man to some Supreme Being. 32 This
concept, while not decisive for current interpretation, certainly influ-
enced the early cases that attempted to define "religion."
For the courts, defining "religion" presents a problem of statu-
tory construction.3 3 Generally, the definition of a word in a statute
should mirror the understanding of the legislators who enacted the
statute.34 This approach will usually result in a definition of "reli-
gion" that includes only traditional religions.35  Courts have there-
fore usually construed religion to mean "one's views of his relations
to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for
his being and character, and of obedience to his will."' 36  Yet early
30. See, e.g., United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting) ("The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation."); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)
(" '[Religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations
they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will.").
3 1. Issues of religion and the relationship between government and religion had played a
direct role in several hundred years of armed conflict in Europe. More recent, and certainly in
the minds of our early leaders, were Henry VIll's break with Rome and subsequent conflicts
with Catholicism, the Anglican-Puritan struggles, and the growing pressure for disestablish-
ment and for toleration for dissenters. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. !, 8-13 (1947).
32. James Madison described religion as "the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
Manner of discharging it." Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance on the Religious Rights of
Man, reprinted as an appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 64 (1947).
33. State statutes exempt religious organizations from property and sales taxes, e.g., ILL.
REv. STAT., ch. 120, § 500.2 (1979). Federal law exempts conscientious objectors from the
draft, Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 612, 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (1981). The Internal
Revenue Code exempts the income of religious organizations, I.R.C. §§ 501(a), 591(c)(3)
(1976). State statutes often declare that prisoners are entitled to the free exercise of religion,
e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 610 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
34. See, e.g., People ex rel v. Fyfe v. Barnett, 319 Ill. 403, 150 N.E. 290 (1926). See also
Frankfurter, Some Reections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 536 (1947).
Another view encourages courts to accord statutory language its present meaning. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 114 A. 825 (1921).
35. See Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 84 Wash. L. Rptr. 1072, 1082
(D.C.T.C. 1956), rep'd, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957), quoted with approval in Fellowship of
Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 704, 315 P.2d 394, 413 (1957)
(dissent).
36. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 222, 241 (1890). See also United States v. Macintosh, 283
U.S. 605, 633-34 (193 1) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) ("The essence of religion is belief in a rela-
tion to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.").
cases indicated judicial dissatisfaction with the requirement of belief
in a deity, and intimated that, while belief in a Supreme Being was a
characteristic common to most religions, it was not necessarily a re-
quirement. 37 Justice Jackson indicated the Court's reluctance to im-
pose orthodoxy of thought in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette."38 "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constel-
lation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opin-
ion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. 39
Justice Douglas voiced a similar view a year later in United States v.
Ballard,4 0 stating that freedom of religion "embraces the right to
maintain theories. . . which are rank heresy to followers of the or-
thodox faiths. . . . Men may believe what they cannot prove."',
The draft cases involving claims for conscientious objector sta-
tus42 illustrate this evolution in the judicial definition of religion.43
In United States v. Seeger, I the Supreme Court construed "religion"
within the meaning of a conscientious objector statute, which pro-
vided: "Religious training and belief in this connection means an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being-involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not in-
clude essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code."45 The Court held that Seeger merited
37. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.l (1961) (recognizing as religions Bud-
dhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism, though they "do not teach what
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God"); Fellowship of Humanity v.
County of Alameda, 153 Cal App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957) (allowing tax exemption since
the group's activities closely resembled theistic religious groups except for lack of belief in a
Supreme Being).
38. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
39. Id at 642.
40. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
41. Id at 86.
42. 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1976) provides in part:
Any person claiming exemption from combatant training and service because of such
conscientious objections whose claim is sustained by the local [Selective Service]
board shall, if he is inducted into the armed forces. . . be assigned to noncombatant
service as defined by the President, or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously op-
posed to participation in such noncombatant service, in lieu of such induction, be
ordered by his local board. . . to perform. . . such civilian work contributing to the
maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest as the Director may deem
appropriate.
For a discussion of conscientious objector exemptions and alternative duty, see Redlich and
Feinberg, Individual Conscience and the Selective Conscientious Objector. The Right Not to
Kill, 44 N.Y. U.L. REV. 875, 898-99 (1969).
43. Eg., compare David v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1890) (to call advocacy of po-
lygamy "a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind") with United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (unusual religious beliefs are not less worthy of protection).
The Supreme Court's expansive approach parallels an evolving religious toleration devel-
oping in the international community. See generally McDougall, Lasswell & Chen, The Right
to Religious Freedom and World Public Order. The Emerging Norm ofNondiscrimination 74
MICH. L. REV. 865 (1976).
44. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
45. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 60), 62 Stat. 612 (current version at 50 U.S.C.
exemption from military service because his "religious" beliefl 6 rep-
resented a belief in "a relation to a Supreme Being" consistent with
congressional intent. The Court held that a "sincere and meaningful
belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to
that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemp-
tion comes within the statutory definition."47
Although Congress subsequently amended the statute to elimi-
nate the "Supreme Being" requirement,48 Seeger continued to re-
quire an inference that a claimant's belief be "religious." In Welsh v.
United States,49 however, the Court broadened its view to include
moral or ethical beliefs,5 ° requiring that the claimed belief "play the
role of a religion and function as a religion in the registrant's life."
'5 1
The Court held that a sincere petitioner might lose the exemption
only if his system of beliefs did "not rest at all upon moral, ethical,
or religious principle but instead [rests] solely upon considerations of
policy, pragmatism, or expediency."52
Although the Civil Rights Act prohibited religious discrimina-
tion, it failed to define "religion," 53 and the courts never established
the meaning of that term under the Civil Rights Act. 4 The EEOC,
however, in a 1970 case, adopted the Supreme Court's definition of
"religion" in the conscientious objector cases as the definition for use
app. § 4560) (1976)). The legislature added "Supreme Being" language after Berman v.
United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 759 (1946), in which the court
denied objector status to a socialist who opposed war as morally wrong. For a discussion of
nature of the religious belief required for draft exemption see United States ex rel. Phillips v.
Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943), and United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir.
1943).
46. Seeger remained unsure of his belief in God, but he did believe in goodness and
virtue, and held a religious faith in a purely ethical creed.
47. 380 U.S. at 176. The history of the "Supreme Being" element of the statute's reli-
gious test (see supra note 46), as well as its clear language, indicate that Congress probably
intended to limit conscientious objector status to those who believe in God as that term is
commonly understood. The Court's discussion of statutory construction and congressional
intent appears to be merely a device to avoid declaring the statutory definition of religion an
unconstitutional discrimination against nontheistic religions. See 380 U.S. at 188-93 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
48. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1(7), 81 Stat. 104 (current
version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1976)).
49. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
50. Id at 340.
51. Id at 339. In Welsh the registrant refused to classify his beliefs as religious yet the
Court still found the beliefs emanated from moral and ethical tenets held with the sincerity of
traditional religious beliefs. Id at 340.
52. 398 U.S. at 342-43 (emphasis added). The ruling represented the final step in a re-
markable judicial translation of legislative language. Section 6(j) excluded from exemption
those whose opposition to war rested on "essentially political, sociological or philosophical"
grounds. 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1970). The Seeger court, in expanding the concept of reli-
gion, narrowed the exclusion to those beliefs of a "political, sociological or economic" nature.
380 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added). Finally, in Welsh, the three categories had been reduced to
"policy, pragmatism, or expediency." 398 U.S. at 343.
53. See supra note 28.
54. See Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 614-19.
in employment discrimination cases." Although the EEOC found
no evidence in this 1970 case that the employee involved belonged to
"an organized sect whose beliefs are common to a number of peo-
ple,"' 56 it determined that her belief fell within the coverage of the
Act because she held her conviction "with the strength of traditional
religious convictions. 57 The EEOC essentially applied the Seeger-
Welsh test 58 to ascertain whether the belief merited the Act's protec-
tion. Nothing in the legislative history relating to the 1972 amend-
ment to the Act5 9 indicates any congressional intention to change the
application of the test.
60
While courts have held that Title VII encompasses atheistic be-
liefs, 61 its protection does not include all beliefs. Even though the
definition of "religion" appears broad, the "religion" protected by
the Constitution clearly cannot be subjective or merely a matter of
personal preference. 62 The courts have relied on the views of some
progressive theologians, notably Paul Tillich.63 Tillich finds the es-
sence of religion to lie in the phrase "ultimate concern."' Not
merely a matter of "personal choice deduced from economic or so-
cial ideology, [a religious belief] must consider man's nature or the
scheme of his existence as it relates in a theological framework, and
55. EEOC Dec. No. 71-779, summarized at 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 172 (Dec. 21,
1970).
56. Id at 173.
57. Id
58. Courts have adopted the Seeger- Welsh test in a variety of contexts. See Founding
Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.) (truth in labeling require-
ment held inapplicable; doctrine of Scientology likened to traditional religions because it com-
prehensively explained man's nature and place in the universe), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963
(1969); Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (Church of New Song allowed
to claim protection of first amendment and thus to hold worship services in prison; doctrine of
Church analogized to Hindu faith), affdper curiam, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1012 (1974); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.D.C. 1962) (Muslims entitled
to first amendment privileges in prison because their faith, in its nature and effect on individu-
als, compared to recognized religious faiths); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813,
40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (Indian users of peyote exempt from regulation banning such use be-
cause of their belief that peyote use brought them into contact with God).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
60. 118 CONG. REC. 705-06 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); see Weitkenaut v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D. Vt. 1974) (citing with approval Sen.
Randolph's remarks); see also Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 618 n.95 ("That title VII
meant to incorporate a broad definition of religion is beyond dispute. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the legislative history, which indicates that an amendment to exempt atheists from
the protection of Title VII was defeated.").
61. Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1975)
(atheist held to be victim of religious discrimination).
62. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972). (Thoreau's beliefs were subjective
rejection of social values, a "choice that was philosophical and personal rather than religious
• . ."); Edwards v. School Bd. of Norton, 483 F. Supp. 620, 624 (W.D. Va. 1980) (for Title VII
purposes, religious belief excludes mere personal preference), vacated in part and remanded on
other grounds, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981).
63. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965).
64. P. TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 1-2 (1958).
the belief must be sincerely held . . .,,.65 A claim based on "reli-
gious" status may be rebutted by showing that the claimant does not
hold the asserted belief in good faith, but "erected [the belief]/ br the
sole purpose of cloaking a secular enterprise with the legal protec-
tions of religion."
66
As in any situation in which a certain group acquires preferred
status, the possibility exists that some individuals will attempt to take
advantage of the preferred position.67 For example, frequently ac-
commodating an employee's religious beliefs affords that employee
some benefits or preferential treatment otherwise not available to
him. Theoretically, someone could claim that his religion required
him to bowl every Wednesday night, and the employer would have
to allow him that time off.68 On the other hand, numerous small
religious groups exist, or may exist in the future, whose members
fervently believe in their faiths, however unusual, and these faiths
should clearly enjoy protection. Delineating these two extremes and
defining what constitutes a bona fide religious belief represents a dif-
ficult undertaking because all religions are "based more on faith
than on reason, [and are therefore,] by definition, somewhat
irrational.
69
The question of an employee's sincerity often involves inquiring
whether the employee in practice adheres to the alleged belief.7"
Some of the most difficult cases in this area focus on an employee's
belief that has evolved over a period of time. The courts only re-
quire the belief to be religious within the employee's own moral, eth-
ical or religious conception at the time it is claimed, and to be held
65. Edwards v. Scbool Bd. of Norton, 483 F. Supp. 620, 624 (W.D. Va. 1980), vacatedin
part and remanded on other grounds, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981).
66. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1162 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
67. Compare People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964)
(peyote use as sacramental symbol by Native American Church over period of several centu-
ries) with In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964) (small group of
recent origin claiming peyote use for religious purposes).
68. To discourage insincerity, religious accommodation claims might, in appropriate
cases, be conditioned on the petitioner's agreement to the imposition of some alternative duty
or burden. Selective service statutes contain such provisions. See supra note 44. The use of
alternative burdens would promote three desirable ends: it would discourage insincere claims,
minimize the cost of engaging in accommodation, and accord roughly equivalent treatment to
exempted and unexempted persons.
69. Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 615.
70. See, e.g., Theriault v. Silber, 391 F. Supp. 578, 582 (W.D. Tex. 1975) (Eclatarian faith
not considered religious because the church operated as "masquerade" that encouraged "do-
as-you-please philosophy"), vacated and remanded per curiam, 547 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977); Hansard v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 7560 (E.D. Tex. 1973) (employee refused to work on Sunday because of alleged reli-
gious reasons even though he had worked on previous Sundays after the date of his conversion
to a no-Sunday-work religion, and he offered no adequate explanation for this); Dobkin v.
District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657, 659 (D.C. App. 1963) (defendant sought continuance of
trial on grounds it would extend into his Sabbath, though defendant often worked in the office
on his Sabbath).
with the "strength of more traditional religious convictions."'" Thus,
when an employee merely stated that he reaffirmed his belief in strict
Sunday Sabbath observance after his son miraculously recovered
from surgery, without elaborating on the basis of that belief, a court
held that the plaintiff "failed to demonstrate the requisite sincerity of
religious convictions to make out a prima facie case."72
The courts have not established any formal requirements relat-
ing to membership in a religious organization,73 duration of adher-
ence to the belief, or consistency in that adherence.74 Consequently,
employers bear an almost insurmountable burden of proof in at-
tempting to impugn an employee's sincerity. Because of such proof
problems, the parties often stipulate to the sincerity of religious be-
lief, or do not dispute the employee's sincerity.75
Apparently, all groups legitimately labelled religious share one
quality: "[T]hey address the ultimate questions of existence and at-
tempt to cope with the unknowable. '76  Religion functions to pro-
vide the adherent with answers to the fundamental questions of
71. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 337 (1970). See also Hansard v. Johns-
Manville Prod. Corp., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7560 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
72. Id at 7562. The employee worked on Sundays for a considerable period after his
son's miraculous recovery before the employee requested Sundays off.
73. While courts sometimes suggest that a religious "belief must have an institutional
quality about it," Edwards v. School Bd. of Norton, 483 F. Supp. 620, 624 (W.D. Va. 1980),
vacated in part and remanded on other grounds, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981) this element acts
more as a test of sincerity than as a requirement of "religion." See, e.g., Remmers v. Brewer,
361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'dper curiam, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1012 (1974). Of course, an employee may try to prove his sincerity by introducing other
followers as witnesses. Id
74. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), in which the Court reversed an
Indiana decision denying unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who quit work when
asked to produce tank turrets although he acknowledged that he would not object to producing
the raw material for the same tanks. The Court stated:
The [Indiana] court found this position inconsistent with Thomas' stated opposition
to participation in the production of armaments. . . . Thomas drew a line and it is
not for use to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not
undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer. . . is "struggling" with his
position ...
The Indiana court also appears to have given significant weight to the fact that
another Jehovah's Witness had no scruples about working on tank turrets; for that
other Witness, at least, such work was "scripturally" acceptable .... (T]he guaran-
tee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of
a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function
and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more
correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation.
Id at 715-16.
75. See, e.g., Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 142 n.3 (5th Cir.
1975) ("there is no question of the sincerity of Mrs. Young's religious beliefs"); Reid v. Mem-
phis Publ. Co., 468 F.2d 346, 348 (6th Cir. 1972); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1114
(5th Cir. 1972); Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Dawson v.
Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511, 513 (E.D. Va. 1971); Jackson v. Veri Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp.
1276, 1278 (E.D. La. 1969); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F.Supp. 709, 711 (W.D. Mich.
1969), rev'd, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'dby an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (197 1).
76. Note, Defning Religion.- Of God, The Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. OF CHi. L.
REv. 533, 550 (1965).
life-the nature of existence and the role of the individual within
that existence. For a belief-system to play in the life of an individual
a role analogous to that played by conventional faiths, the system
must approximate the comprehensiveness of conventional religions
regarding the number of relationships to which it is relevant, and in
the number of things it explains or the number of questions it an-
swers. 77 Two consequences of this cosmological aspect of religion
taken together aid in distinguishing religious from nonreligious be-
lief. First, because religious belief is comprehensive, it may poten-
tially permeate the believer's every action.78 Second, because the
explanations offered by a religious belief defy empirical verification
and wholly rational understanding, it must rest on faith.79
Legal writers have frequently attempted to systematize the defi-
nition of religion,8" but the courts have largely refused to confine
themselves so narrowly. For the foreseeable future the courts seem
likely to construe "religion" broadly, and to insist only that the em-
ployee hold the "religious belief' sincerely.8'
C. Burdens on Free Exercise of Religion
Religious discrimination in employment has at least three possi-
ble definitions: (1) discrimination by intent, which limits violation of
religious tenets to wilfull discrimination by an employer, such as the
refusal to hire a person merely because of his religious persuasion;
(2) discrimination by effect, which broadens violation to include the
impact of an employment rule if it adversely affects a particular em-
ployee in the practice of his religious beliefs regardless of motive,
such as a rule requiring all employees to work on Saturday, which
rule would negatively impact the religious practices of Sabbatari-
ans;82 and (3) the accommodation rule, which also broadens violation
to discrimination by effect, but permits an employer to exonerate
himself by proving that he made efforts to reasonably accommodate
77. See Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C.
Cir.) (faith in Scientology religious because it provided a "general account of man and his
nature comparable in scope, if not content, to those of some recognized religions"), cert. de-
nied 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
78. "By its nature, religion - in the comprehensive sense in which the Constitution uses
that word - is an aspect of human thought and action which profoundly relates the life of man
to the world in which he lives. Religious beliefs pervade ...virtually all human activity."
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
79. See United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
80. See, e.g., Note, supra note 76, at 550-51; Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free
Exercise Clause. A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 363 (1980).
81. "Religious belief.., is a belief finding expression in a conscience which categori-
cally requires the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom in
preference to transgressing its tenets." United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir.
1943).
82. A Sabbatarian is one who observes the Sabbath on Saturday.
the employee or by showing that accommodation would cause undue
hardship to his business.
The core of the free exercise of religion clause is voluntarism-
the inviolability of conscience.8 3 At a minimum, the clause guaran-
tees freedom of conscience by preventing any degree of compulsion
in matters of belief. It prohibits not only direct compulsion but also
any indirect coercion that might result from subtle discrimination;
84
hence, any burden based specifically on one's religion offends the
free exercise clause.
Problems arise when the law forces an individual to choose be-
tween following his religious principles, thereby suffering an eco-
nomic or other loss, and abandoning his religion or conscience to
avoid loss. 5 Legislatures and courts generally recognize that forcing
this choice differs entirely from outlawing a religious practice, but
still substantially interferes with religious liberty. Hence, they have
made "an effort to accommodate the demands of the state to the con-
science of the individual."86 Most of the states which have passed
Sunday closing laws, for example, have provided an exemption for
those who rest on a different day because of religious conviction.87
Consistent with the general legislative recognition of the desirability
of accommodating religious beliefs,8 8 Congress requires employers
to make "reasonable accommodations" for the religious practices of
their employees.89
III. Types of Religious Needs that Seek Accommodation
Courts more readily grant an exemption when fundamental
83. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part
. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1386 (1967).
84. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (prison must provide Buddhist reasonable
opportunity to pursue his faith comparable to that afforded other prisoners); Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (Jehovah's Witnesses meeting may not be barred from public park
open to other religious services).
85. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Stewart,. J., dissenting) ("Penn-
sylvania has passed a [Sunday] law which compels an orthodox Jew to choose between his
religious faith and his economic survival"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("The
ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting bene-
fits, on one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work,
on the other hand.").
86. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946). At times, however, religious lib-
erty must yield to an overriding government interest. See, e.g., United States v. Lee. 50
U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (Amish objection to participation in Social Security system
must yield to need to preserve viability of an important government program).
87. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Appendix II to Opinion of Justice
Frankfurter at 551 et seq. ).
88. The contribution that religion makes to the community presents a major justification
for granting exemptions. The Court said in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 170 (1965):
"All our history gives confirmation to the view that liberty of conscience has a moral and
social value which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the state." The Court
quoted from Stone (later appointed Chief Justice), The Conscientious Objector, 21 COL. UNIV.
Q. 253, 269 (1919).
89. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
principles of religion or conscience conflict with the law than when
the conflict involves a noncentral tenet of the religion.90 One
writer9' has criticized this approach because of the difficulty in dis-
cerning "a fundamental principle," "a central tenet," or "a corner-
stone of religion." He argues that sometimes disputes arise even
within a given religion regarding the religion's central tenets. Fur-
ther, because religious practices frequently appear irrational to non-
members, the courts cannot realistically choose which among many
conflicting practices warrant protection. Tests, such as whether a
particular belief attracts only a handful of followers or qualifies as
unorthodox by contemporary standards, do not suffice when their
application precludes legal protection. Indeed, some of the world's
largest religions, such as Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, did not
conform to prevailing beliefs at the time of their establishment.
To date, most claims for accommodation have involved an em-
ployee's work schedule, his refusal to join a union or pay union dues,
or his desire to wear his hair or clothing in a certain manner. This
article will discuss these situations first. In view of the great diversity
of religious beliefs and practices in this country, however, many
other potential claims for accommodation exist. We will then ex-
amine these.92
Employees seek accommodation most frequently when their
work schedules conflict with religious mandates. An employer must
attempt to accommodate reasonable requests by employees for ab-
sence on their Sabbath or other religious holidays. 93 For example,
members of certain religious groups (most notably orthodox Jews
and Seventh Day Adventists) regard Saturday as their Sabbath.9"
90. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), the Court's language implicitly reaf-
firmed the approach of according more protection to fundamental principles: 'i/ndamenial
principles of conscience and religious duty may sometimes override the demands of the secular
state." Id at 445 (emphasis added).
For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court regarded the obser-
vance of the Sabbath as "a cardinal principle" of the faith of Seventh Day Adventists. In
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), the court sustained an
exemption from the drug laws, noting that peyote played "a central role in the ceremony and
practice of the Native American Church," id at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73, and
that the "ceremony marked by the sacremental use of peyote composes the cornerstone of the
peyote religion." Id The court also said that '[t]o forbid the use of peyote is to remove the
.theological heart of Peyotism." Id at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
91. M. KONVITz, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 78-79 (1968).
92. See infra notes 106-17 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979); Riley v.
Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th
Cir. 1970), aff'dper curiam by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Willey v. Maben
Mfg., 497 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Miss. 1979); Rankins v. Commission on Professional Compe-
tence, 24 Cal. 3d 167, 593 P.2d 852, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 986 (1979);
Hildebrand v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 765, 566 P.2d 1297, 140
Cal. Rptr. 151 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978); California Teachers Ass'n v. Board of
Trustees, 70 Cal. App. 3d 431, - P.2d -, 138 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1977).
94. More than one million non-Sunday Sabbatarians exist in the United States today,
including an estimated 750,000 orthodox Jews, 425,000 Seventh Day Adventists, and 5,000
Their religious beliefs forbid them to work on the Sabbath, the day
of rest. 95 Certain employers, however, require that their employees
work on Saturday to obtain or retain their jobs,96 thus forcing an
employee to choose between work and religion. An employee faces
the same problem if his schedule requires him to work when his
church has assigned him to teach a Bible study class97 or when he
must attend a mandatory religious assembly.9" A similar conflict
arises when a company requires employees to take their vacations
during a two-week plant shutdown, does not permit leaves of ab-
sence exceeding two days, and an employee's church requires its
members to attend the church's annual national convention.99
A second major situation in which employees seek accommoda-
tion occurs when employees object to joining or supporting a labor
union."° The objection hinges upon their religious belief that sup-
porting union picketing and strikes violates the Biblical command to
love one's neighbor.' 0 '
A third area requiring accommodation involves employees' per-
sonal appearances. Typical cases occur when an employee has
grown a beard 0 2 or worn certain apparel 0 3 that an employer feels
Seventh Day Baptists. 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972) (remarks of Senator Randolph). Other
faiths, such as Islam, also celebrate the Sabbath on a day other than Sunday. See Rodman v.
Robinson, 134 N.C. 503, 510, 47 So. 19, 21 (1904).
95. The basis for this belief is a literal interpretation of the Fourth Commandment in the
Bible which states: "Six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work: but the seventh day is a
sabbath unto the Lord thy God; in it thou shalt not do any manner of work. Exodus
20:9, 10; Deuteronomy 5:13, 14 (King James).
96. Saturday and Sunday work may become increasingly common, as employers choose
or are required to spread out energy use, avoid traffic congestion, and permit more extensive
use of recreational facilities.
97. Redmond v. GAP Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir. 1978).
98. See, e.g., School Dist. No. I I v. Umberfield, 32 Colo. App. 306, 512 P.2d 1166 (1973),
modyFed and a'd, 522 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1974).
99. EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 6206 (1973) (EEOC Dec. No. 71-463 (1970)). See also
Niederhuber v. Camden County Vocational Technical School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 495 F. Supp.
273 (D.N.J. 1980) (teacher required to miss from five to ten work days per year to observe holy
days of Worldwide Church of God).
100. Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 444
U.S. 928 (1980); Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1072 (1979); Anderson v. General Dynamics, 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'g, 489
F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Cal. 1980); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978);
Cooper v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cer. -de-
nied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1027 (D. Ore. 1979),
aff'd 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 671 (1982).
101. Mark 12:31 (King James).
102. EEOC v. Sambo's of Ga., Inc., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas (BNA) 1210 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(Sikh refused to shave his facial hair); Eastern Greyhound Lines v. New York Div. of Human
Rights, 34 A.D.2d 916, 311 N.Y.S.2d 465, afj'd, 27 N.Y.2d 279, 265 N.E.2d 745, 317 N.Y.S.2d
322 (1970). Other cases might involve hair length, e.g., Longo v. Carlisle De Coppet & Co.,
537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (employer required short hair on men); Teterud v. Gillman, 522
F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) (Plains Indian wore long hair), or hair style (a Har Krishna's queue).
103. EEOC v. Rollins, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 492 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (Black Muslim
wore "certain religious clothing"); 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 23 (June 197 1) (Black Mus-
may adversely affect his business."
In numerous situations, an employee may seek exemption from
performing a certain job assignment, °5 from participating in a cer-
tain program,' °6 from undergoing medical tests or treatment, 0 7 or
from meeting other requirements of employment.0 8 In other cases,
the employee may ask the employer to provide something needed for
religious observance or practice, especially if the employee's assign-
ment entails working in a remote area without normal facilities and
materials. Accommodation might require providing a place of wor-
ship, and perhaps even a chaplain; 0 9 a special diet"0 or cooking
utensils;"'. or such items as candles and incense." 2 Finally, employ-
ees may assert a variety of other needs for religious accommoda-
tion," 3 such as refusing to sit on a promotion review board,' '
4
proselytizing fellow employees," 15 refusing to work with members of
lim wore ankle length dress); 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 172 (Dec. 1970) (nurse of Old
Catholic faith wore close-fitting scarf instead of nurse's cap).
Other cases might involve a Sikh wearing a turban, Sherwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d 47 (9th
Cir. 1980), or an orthodox Jew refusing to remove his hat, Close-it Enterprises v. Weinberger,
64 A.D.2d 686, 407 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1978).
104. Although sometimes justified for safety reasons, the employer's feelings often mani-
fest his own bias rather than reflect legitimate concern for the welfare of his business.
105. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (Jehovah's Witness assigned to
work on armament production); Gavin v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Jehovah's Witness required to raise American flag); Chapman v. Pickett, 491 F. Supp. 967
(C.D. I11.), rev'd and remanded mem., 645 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1980) (Black Muslim required to
handle pork in cleaning kitchen); Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C. 1979)
(Roman Catholic Internal Revenue Service employee required to rule on tax-exempt status of
organizations which promote abortion and homosexuality); Kenny v. Ambulatory Centre of
Miami, 400 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. App. 1981) (nurse required to assist in abortions).
106. Eg., a training program including Darwin's theory of evolution, or other subjects
which invoke religious objections. See also, e.g., Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980) (Jehovah's Witness required to teach a "patriotic"
curriculum including the pledge of allegiance).
107. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination);
Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1980) (claim for disability benefits after refusal to have
surgery to remove tumor); Kolbeck v. Kramer, 202 A.2d 889 (N.J. Super. 1964) modiled on
other grounds, 214 A.2d 408 (1965) (medical tests); State ex rel Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39
Wash. 2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952) (x-ray examination); Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147
N.W. 966 (1914) (examination for venereal disease).
108. Eg., a picture on an I.D. card. See Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 455,
593 P.2d 1363, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979) (taking photograph prohibited because photo-
graph is "graven image").
109. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-98 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). See also Katz, Freedom ofReligion and State Neutrality, 20 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 426, 429-
33 (1953).
110. Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975) (provide kosher food for orthodox
Jew).
111. Schlesinger v. Carlson, 489 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (provide hot plate and
special room for preparation of Passover meal).
112. Childs v. Duckworth, 509 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Inc. 1981).
113. Many such requests have arisen outside of employment, such as schools, prisons, and
license applications, and it seems likely that such claims will eventually be made in the em-
ployment area.
114. In re Jenison, 125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1963) (Bible teachers: "Judge not, that ye be
not judged.").
115. Sutin, The Experience ofState Fair Employment Commissions.- A Comparative Study,
18 VAND. L. REV. 965, 996 (1965).
a certain race,1 6 or wearing a religious symbol." 17
While an employer may have an affirmative duty to accommo-
date the employee's religious needs, the employee must also under-
take certain responsibilities. First, the employee must hold a sincere
religious conviction and demonstrate that his practices reflect that
conviction." 8  Second, the employee must acquaint his employer
with the employee's religious needs, as well as the potential impact
of his religion on his job performance."' This allows the employer
to accommodate the employee's needs. 2° Third, the employee must
perform his work adequately to avoid justifiable discharge for in-
competence. Additionally, an employee's responsibility includes
maintaining a flexible attitude. 12  For example, in United States v.
City of Albuquerque 122 a fireman whose religion prevented him from
working on his Sabbath refused to meet with officials who offered to
arrange alternative employment with the city. The court therefore
determined that the employer had reasonably accommodated the
employee and consequently denied the employee's claim of religious
discrimination. This case suggests that an obdurate employee can-
not expect relief from the judicial system. By contrast, in Young v.
Southwestern Savings and Loan Association, 123 the court approved
an atheist bank teller's failure to negotiate with her employer after
the employer required her to attend "sermonettes" before mandatory
116. Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434
U.S. 1063 (1978) (private school's racial discrimination on religious grounds).
117. E.g., a crucifix, Star of David, or "I Found It" button.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. IV, 1974). The
EEOC has decided that the belief need only be held with the strength of traditional religious
convictions; it need not represent a belief of an organized religion. In cases of unknown, non-
orthodox, or unpopular sects, however, the courts tend to stress the possibility of fraudulent
claims. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967) (use of marijuana). Therefore,
organized religions may encounter less trouble in obtaining exemptions than unorganized reli-
gions. Because fraudulent claims are more likely to occur with unknown religions, stressing
the greater possibility of fraudulent claims is reasonable. Compare People v. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) with Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th
Cir. 1967). The true question, however, consists of whether the public interest in preventing
fraudulent claims outweighs the damage to religious liberty that results from this emphasis on
fraudulent claims in cases of unpopular religions. The answer to this question requires a diffi-
cult value judgment.
119. Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039
(1978); Willey v. Maben Mfg., 479 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Miss. 1979).
120. EEOC Dec. No. 72-1579 (1972), 1973 E.E.O.C. COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 6363. The
Commission held that the employee's failure to give the employer advance notice of his inabil-
ity to work on Saturdays relieved the employer of the duty to accommodate because the em-
ployer maintained no available pool of qualified substitutes.
121. In numerous cases decided against the employer, the courts noted that the employee
had remained willing to accommodate and in fact had suggested reasonable accommodations
that the discriminating employer could have adopted. See Drum v. Ware, 7 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 269 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp.
I (D. Ore. 1973); Daniels v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1323 (D. Ore. 1972).
122. 423 F. Supp. 591 (D.N.M. 1975), 545 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
909 (1977).
123. 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
staff meetings and "close her ears." The court found no inflexible
behavior on the part of the employee, thus suggesting that both em-
ployee and employer must remain flexible and that, when an em-
ployer refuses compromise, an employee can justifiably discontinue
further negotiations.
IV. The Employer's Perspective
A. Scope of the Employer's Duty to Accommodate
The employer must accommodate only insofar as he does not
suffer undue hardship. Most courts require the employer to demon-
strate attempted accommodation before he can claim undue hard-
ship as a defense.' 24 If a qualified prospective employee objects to
an employment practice on religious grounds, the employer must try
to accommodate the employee prior to hiring him.' 25 If a present
employee objects to a business practice, the employer should not
force him to choose between his religion and his job. t26 Nor should
an employer make work so intolerable that an employee will resign,
thereby relieving the employer of his duty. 
27
Granting an exemption from a work rule or requirement, or
providing the needed facilities or materials, will accommodate most
religious needs of employees. 28 When the employee's claim for ac-
commodation involves the work schedule,' 29 however, an employer
may choose from a variety of available methods 3 ° including: allow
the employee to work a shorter week,' 3 ' or longer hours on the days
he works;' 32 allow the employee to use vacation time for days he
must miss work; 13 3 allow the employee an unpaid leave of ab-
sence;' 34 allow the employee to substitute another employee, 35 or
124. See Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978); Shaffield v. Northrop
Worldwide Aircraft Serv. Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 944 (M. D. Ala. 1974); Claybaugh v. Pacific
Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. I, 5 (D. Ore. 1973). But see Draper v. United States Pipe
& Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975) (in which court observed employer could
prove undue hardship without actually undertaking any accommodations).
125. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975), aj'd by an equal,
divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), rev'd on rehearing, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
126. Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144-45 (5th Cir. 1975).
127. Id
128. See supra text accompanying notes 100-116.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 92-99.
130. The difficulty of arriving at a clear definition of reasonable accommodation has led
one court to comment: "In a sense the case boils down to a determination as to whether [the
employer] acted reasonably under all the circumstances." Williams v. Southern Union Gas
Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976).
131. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432
U.S. 63 (1977). N
132. EEOC Dec. No. 70-716 (1970); EEOC Dec. No. 6150 (1973).
133. United States v. City of Albuquerque, 423 F. Supp. 591 (D.N.M. 1975), 545 F.2d 110
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977).
134. Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039
(1978); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacatedand
remanded, 560 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1977).
swap shifts; 136 transfer the employee to another job or shift; 137 allow
the employee to pay the cost of overtime for a substitute em-
ployee, 38 or work overtime at regular pay himself to compensate for
the cost; or allow the employee to work on a flexible schedule if his
work so allows.
B. Undue Hardship
Determination of a "reasonable accommodation" involves a
balancing between ease of accommodation and undue hardship.
139
Most methods for accommodating an employee's need for religious
time off140 tend to impose some hardship either on the employer or
on other employees. The courts, however, have sharply split in de-
termining how severe a hardship can be imposed, and upon
whom.1 4' The key areas of disagreement have involved allegations
of undue hardship in connection with accommodations that would
conflict with a collective bargaining agreement, 42 affect the mo-
rale 43 or health and safety'" of the other employees, or would in-
135. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520-21 (6th Cir. 1975). If
the employee's job requires highly specialized or unique skill, substitution may not be possible.
Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915
(1976); Roberts v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 315 (D.S.C. 1973),
a~ff'd without published opinion, 498 F.2d 1397 (1974). If the job requires little or no special
skill, or if the work force available to the employer produces other employees who could easily
substitute for the Sabbatarian worker, courts have found a violation of Title VII. Claybaugh
v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. I (D. Ore. 1973); Dixon v. Omaha Public
Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974). Even in situations in which the employee
occupies a highly specialized position, the existence of a sufficient number of employees
equally capable of substituting for the discharged person may prohibit discharge in connection
with one's religious beliefs. And if there is no available substitute, the employer may be re-
quired to train one. EEOC Dec. No. 71-463 (1970) (CCH) EEOC Dec. 6206 (1973).
136. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520-21 (6th Cir. 1975);
EEOC Dec. No. 72-2066, summarized at 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1063 (1972).
137. Drum v. Ware, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 269 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (reasonable
accommodation achieved when the religious observer was shifted to another post office located
25 miles from where he had been working); Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355
F. Supp. I (D. Ore. 1973) (reasonable accommodation can be made by finding an "open posi-
tion" for the religious observer).
138. Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 560 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1977).
139. Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. Or. 1973).
140. See supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
141. See Covino, Religious Discrimination in Employment. Striking the Delicate Balance,
80 DICK. L. REV. 717, 723-25 (1976); Gorden, Up.Against the Accommodation Rule, 45
U.Mo.K.C. L. REV. 56, 62 (1976).
142. Compare Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1970) (a vari-
ance of a union contract to allow accommodation of one employee at the expense of others
would "constitute unequal administration of the collective bargaining agreement among the
employees"), ail'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971), and Dawson v. Mizell, 325
F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1971) with Hardison v. TWA, 527 F.2d 33, 41 (8th Cir. 1975) ("It would
seem that a collective bargaining agreement, the seniority provisions of which preclude any
reasonable accommodation for religious observances by employees, is prima facie evidence of
union and employer culpability under the Act."), rev'd, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
143. Compare Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir.
1975) ("The objections and complaints of fellow employees ... do not constitute undue hard-
ship in the conduct of the employer's business.") and Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d
volve additional expense to the employer. 45
Most lower courts have found intangible losses to the employer
insufficient to sustain the burden of establishing undue hardship.
For example, an accommodation described as disruptive, bother-
some, or inconvenient did not constitute undue hardship. 46 Fur-
ther, complaints from fellow employees as to schedule adjustments,
substitution, and shift exchanges seldom establish undue hardship
unless employee discontent causes "chaotic personnel problems."'
147
The feasibility of interchanging manpower and facilities plays
an important role in determining undue hardship. In large corpora-
tions enjoying plentiful resources and manpower, reassigning em-
ployees or incurring additional expenses to accommodate does not
establish undue hardship. 41 On the other hand, smaller corpora-
tions that have less flexibility in terms of spending and rescheduling
suffer undue hardship if they must modify their system of operations
to accommodate employees' religious beliefs.
149
An employer may prove undue hardship, however, by demon-
strating that business necessity mandates the particular employment
practice that infringes upon an employee's religious belief. In
Claybaugh v. Pacfic Northwest Bell Telephone Company, "So the court
perceived the necessity of balancing the employee's right to reason-
544 (6th Cir. 1975), a#'d by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), rev'd on rehearing, 433
U.S. 903 (1977), with Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 522 (6th Cir. 1975)
("Lower morale would result from resentment of the copyreaders with more seniority who
preferred to be off Saturday for nonreligious reasons if the management sought to accommo-
date the plaintiff's religious practices."), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1976).
144. The courts generally agreed that "safety considerations [were] highly relevant in de-
termining whether a proposed accommodation would produce an undue hardship on the em-
ployer's business." Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 521 (6th Cir.
1975). They disagreed, however, on how strictly this standard should be applied. See Dixon
v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974).
145. Compare Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 527 (6th Cir. 1975) (while
overtime costs do not constitute undue hardship per se, the amount of overtime that the em-
ployer would have had to pay in that case did create an undue hardship), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
915 (1976), with Hardison v. TWA, 527 F.2d 33, 40 (8th Cir. 1975) (overtime costs alone do not
constitute an undue hardship), rev'd, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
146. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradire." Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Em-
ployment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 82 (1972).
147. "If employees are disgruntled because an employer accommodates its work rules to
the religious needs of one employee . . . such grumbling must yield to the single employee's
right to practice his religion." Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), rev'd on rehearing, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
No employer has successfully met the "chaotic personnel problems" standard.
148. Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. I, 5-6 (D. Ore. 1973).
149. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 497 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974). In this case,
Johnson, a part-time employee who, for religious reasons, refused to work on Saturdays and
was consequently discharged, sued a small post office branch that employed only five clerks-
two full-time, two part-time and one temporary. The court upheld Johnson's discharge, rea-
soning that the employer employed so few people that it would suffer undue hardship if re-
quired to employ an inflexible part-time employee. (Title VII also prohibits discrimination in
federal government employment, including the United States Postal Service. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000c-17 (Supp. V. 1975)).
150. 355 F. Supp. I (D. Ore. 1973).
able accommodation of his religious needs against the employer's
right to avoid undue hardship:
The requirement upon an employer to make a reasonable ac-
commodation to the religious needs of an employee is not unbend-
ing. However, an employer cannot sustain its burden of showing
undue hardship without first showing that it made an accommo-
dation as an attempted remedy. As the degree of business hard-
ship increases, the quantity of conduct which will satisfy the
reasonable accommodation requirement decreases. The balancing
of reasonableness and hardship is what I believe Chief Justice
Burger [in Griggs] was referring to as the "business necessity"
which would qualify as a legitimate reason for discharging an
employee. 5'
The need to preserve public safety also plays a persuasive role
in establishing undue hardship. In Dixon v. Omaha Public Power
District, 52 the difficulty of obtaining a substitute for a highly trained
lineman to correct high-voltage power line malfunctions constituted
undue hardship because substituting an untrained employee could
endanger the lives of workers and threaten vital power supplies.
Similarly, the absence of a fireman from a fire department with strict
staff limitations constituted undue hardship because the absence in-
creased the risk of harm to the lives and property of citizens and
firemen. 1
53
The necessity of having the work of other employees supervised
may also make it impossible for the employer to accommodate a su-
pervisory employee's religious needs. '"I Substitution or schedule ad-
justments may be impracticable if the employee possesses unusual or
unique talents. In a school system, for example, a substitute teacher
may be unable to maintain the quality and continuity of education
established by the regular teacher. 55 Similarly, the absence of a
highly trained engineer to oversee plant operations and equipment
failures on a round-the-clock basis may cause costly and disruptive
shutdowns that may constitute undue hardship.
56
The courts have often stated that employers occasionally must
bear some costs to accommodate their employees' religious needs. In
151. Id at 6.
152. 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974).
153. United States v. City of Albuquerque, 423 F. Supp. 591 (D.N.M. 1975), af'd 545
F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977).
154. Fischer v. Alsing, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 220, 222 (D. Ore. 1974).
155. In School Dist. No. II v. Umberfield, 32 Colo. App. 306, 512 P.2d 1166 (1973). modi-
fied and af'd, 522 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1974), the employer dismissed a teacher following the
teacher's six-day absence from work. The teacher had attended a mandatory religious assem-
bly. In reversing a holding of discrimination by the state civil rights commission, the court
agreed with the findings of a hearing officer that although lesson plans were prepared in ad-
vance, students "will not progress as well under a substitute teacher."
156. EEOC Dec. No. 4261 (May 7, 1970). The Commission found that because the engi-
neer was "unique in his knowledge" and because his unavailability could result in plant shut-
downs costing as much as $25,000 per day, an accommodation would necessarily entail undlie
hardship.
Dixon v. Omaha Public Power District, '5 however, the court found
that requiring an employer to pay significant additional overtime to
those employees required to substitute for the accommodated em-
ployee imposed undue hardship. More recently, the Sixth Circuit, in
Reid v. Memphis Publishing Company, 158 held that while overtime
costs do not constitute undue hardship per se, the excessive amount
of overtime that the employer would have had to pay in that case did
create undue hardship. Courts also consider whether the employer
can still utilize the involved employees to their fullest capacities de-
spite the substitutions. 59
Administrative inconvenience rarely suffices to constitute undue
hardship. An employer does not prove undue hardship by showing
that a particular method of accommodation presents administrative
difficulty or disrupts routines. 160 Administrative inconvenience will
constitute undue hardship only in situations involving unusually
complicated rotating shifts or emergency services that render the jug-
gling of schedules impracticable.' 6 '
The majority of cases that address the issue of "undue hard-
ship" have involved requests for time off for religious reasons. The
issue can arise, however, in cases involving any religious accommo-
dation. 62 In a recent case,' 63 for example, the court held that a res-
taurant would suffer undue hardship if it were required to employ as
its manager a Sikh who refused to shave his facial hair. The court
anticipated that the restaurant's patrons' reaction would be that
beards promote unsanitary conditions. The court found that undue
hardship would result from the anticipated reaction of the restau-
rant's patrons that beards are unsanitary or are conducive to unsani-
tary conditions, and the fact that the "clean cut" image of the
restaurant and its personnel would be diminished.
157. 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974).
158. 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975) (replacement would cost employer $77 per week extra in
salary), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1976); see also Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 595 F.2d 441
(8th Cir. 1979) (cost of replacement drivers, and costs because of delays and cancellation of
trucking runs when replacement drivers not available, constituted undue hardship).
159. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975); Ward v.
Alleghany Ludlum Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 560
F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1977).
160. 1d See also Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'dby an
equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), rev'd on rehearing, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
161. United States v. City of Albuquerque, 423 F. Supp. 591 (D.N.M. 1975), af'd, 545
F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977); Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist.,
385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974). See also United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451
F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971) (management convenience and business necessity not synony-
mous), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972). But see Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d
512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1976).
162. See supra notes 103-117 and accompanying text.
163. EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., Civ. No. C80- 11648 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 30, 1981).
C Effect of Union Contracts
A delicate balance must be maintained between an individual's
religious freedom and conflicting interests of others in a secular soci-
ety such as ours.'64 Thus, any consideration of the effects of imple-
menting Title VII policies must recognize society's compelling
interest of promoting and sustaining collective bargaining by labor
unions. The National Labor Relations Act "seek[s] to promote in-
dustrial peace . . by fostering a system of employee organization
and collective bargaining."' 65 Significantly, when interpreting the
Act, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of
subordinating the interests of an individual to the collective interests
of all employees in a particular bargaining unit.'66 Specifically,
when individual religious rights conflict with the interests of the rank
and file, the Court has held that in situations in which a collective
bargaining agreement establishing or maintaining a union shop ex-
ists,167 the constitutionally protected right to free exercise of religion
must yield to the governmental interest in protecting collective
bargaining. 168
Initially, the EEOC agreed that federal law did not prohibit dis-
charging an employee for refusing to pay union dues even though
the employee's sincerely held religious beliefs motivated his con-
duct. "'69 In a 1974 decision, however, the EEOC reversed its posi-
tion, 171 clarifying the change in a 1975 report:
.4 contract between an employer and a union will not serve as a
defense by the union to charges of unlawful discrimination. This is
true whether the contract specifically provides for an unlawful
practice or omits any procedure for processing grievances against
an unlawful practice. If an employer. . . is required under law...
to revise its union contract in order to comply with the law. . . then
164. See Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 628.
165. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
166. For example, in Vaca v. Sipes, id., the Court upheld a union's right to settle an em-
ployee's grievance against management in a manner adverse to his interest. The Court found
that allowing an employee to compel arbitration of his grievance regardless of its merits would
substantially undermine the collective bargaining agreement. Id at 191. See also Humphrey
v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) (in absence of unfair representation, union can deprive individ-
ual of seniority rights when seniority lists of two companies become integrated); Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (collective bargaining agreement allowing employer to
credit employees for preemployment as well as postemployment military service in determin-
ing seniority held valid against objection of employees without military experience).
167. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
provides that no federal statute shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a
labor organization to require membership in a union as a condition of employment.
168. Railway Employees Dep't. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). See also Hammon v.
United Papermakers, 462 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1972) (discharge of employee refusing to join
union or pay dues because of religious beliefs not violative of first amendment rights).
169. See I EMPL. PiAc. GUIDE (CCH) 237 (1976).
170. EEOC Dec. No. 74-107 (Apr. 2, 1974), 2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 6430 (1934).
the union involved is expected to cooperate in the revision. 171
Thus, the EEOC clearly does not recognize union-employer contrac-
tual agreements as valid defenses to a charge of religious discrimina-
tion brought under Title VII.
Union contracts and collective bargaining agreements have nev-
ertheless provided the basis for undue hardship claims in the lower
courts. The employer commonly asserts that he cannot accommo-
date the employee because the agreements prohibit the accommoda-
tion. The majority of lower courts have not recognized reliance on
the contract as a defense to failure in attempting to accommodate the
employee's religious needs. 72  One court stated that "even if the
company were so bound [by the bargaining agreement] it may well
be that the company's burden includes seeking union consent to
some form of variance."' 73 Further, the Supreme Court, in Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Company, 171 stated that the principle of non-
discrimination embodied in Title VII merited highest priority in
national labor policy.
When seniority clauses exist in the contracts, 75 however, the re-
sults may differ. Section 703(h) of Title VII1 76 indicates that an em-
ployer need not take action that impinges on a bona fide seniority
system. Thus, an accommodation that required an employer to by-
pass a seniority system has established a defense of undue
hardship. 177
A collective bargaining agreement commonly includes a union
security provision that usually conditions employment on either
membership in the union or the payment of dues to the union by
those who choose not to be active members. 78 Some employees,
171. 81 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 215.2, 335 (1975), GUIDEBOOK TO FAIR EMPLOY-
MENT PRACTICES (1975) (emphasis added).
172. See, e.g., Claybaugh v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. I (D. Ore. 1973).
But see Drum v. Ware, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 269 (W.D.N.C. 1974). (This case impliedly
ranked a union contract paramount to the employer's duty to accommodate.)
173. Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Serv., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 942 (M.D.
Ala. 1974).
174. 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
175. Frequently collective bargaining agreements provide for work allocations based on a
uniformly applied seniority system that establishes objective criteria for determining layoffs,
promotion, shifts, and certain advantages. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair
Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1601 (1969).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) provides in part: "[I]t shall not be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to apply different terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system ...."
177. Huston v. Local 93, UAW, 559 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1977).
178. Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763, 764 (C.D. Cal. 1977), 602 F.2d
904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1980). The Supreme Court has approved the
use of union security clauses as a proper exercise of congressional power under the commerce
clause. Union security clauses provide a means of assuring stable labor relations on the job
site. The compulsory provisions discourage "free riders" so that all who receive the benefits of
the collective bargaining agreement pay their fair share. See Railway Employees Dep't. v.
however, object on religious grounds to the requirement of
financially supporting the union.
179
While individuals should not retain the benefits secured for
them by the union without paying dues, it seems harsh to discharge
employees if their refusal is based upon sincere religious beliefs. In
addition, courts cannot realistically believe that the refusal of a few
individuals in a union shop to pay dues will significantly affect the
union's treasury or impair its ability to bargain collectively. Perhaps
the most equitable alternative in these situations would involve the
union and employer granting limited exemptions from union mem-
bership in return for the employee's contributing to the union a sum
equivalent to union dues with the stipulation that the union donate
the sum to charity. 80 The union would consequently obtain control
over a portion of the employee's money while assuring the employee
that he would not lose his job because of his religious beliefs. Be-
cause employees would not get a "free ride," they would not be
tempted to use claimed religious objections to avoid payment of
union dues and fees.''
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). See generally MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 697-725
(1970).
179. Cooper v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 378 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 (N.D.
Tex. 1974), rey'd, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977). Seventh Day
Adventists, for example, while sympathizing with the basic goals of organized labor, such as
proper wages, hours, and working conditions, place great value upon personal liberty of con-
science. They believe that no person can enjoy or exercise freedom of conscience when bound
to membership in any labor union involving people of various convictions associated together
and mutually required to adhere to policies, comply with decisions, and abide by restrictions
that may conflict with individual conscience. Obviously, occasions arise when, failing to ob-
tain these objectives through the peaceful processes of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration,
unions employ measures of coercion, which take the form of boycotts, strikes, picketing, and
similar methods of enforcing their demands. Guided by the scriptural injunction as Christians
that "the servant of the Lord must not strive," and that he should "do violence to no man,"
Seventh Day Adventists believe sincerely that they must stand apart from a relationship that
requires participation in such procedures. Gray v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 429 F.2d 1064,
1066 n.4 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
180. Cooper v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 378 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex.
1976), rev'd, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977). Since unions
generally expend some of their money for charitable purposes, the unions would thus earmark
the employee's contribution for this purpose.
18 1. As another alternative, the employee could place an amount equal to union dues in
trust to be given to a nonreligious charity. This arrangement resembles the one required by
Congress under the health care institution exemption. Health Care Institution Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. § 169 (Supp. V, 1975). Also, Congress has amended § 19 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1980), to require a charity-substitute in cases such as this. In light
of congressional approval of such a program, and union and judicial approval in other areas,
this arrangement would probably not work an undue hardship on the employer or union. See,
e.g., Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978) (loss to union of $19 per
month in union dues was de minimis and did not constitute undue hardship), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1072 (1979); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978). See also Ross,
Caesar and God" A Statutory Balance - Union Security and Religious Discrimination Under the
Title VII Requirement o/Reasonable Accommodation, 3 INDUs. REL. L.J. 321, 356-57 (1979).
V. The Hardison Case
As the previous sections illustrate, prior to 1977 the lower courts
had developed various interpretations of the accommodation rule,
but the Supreme Court had not ruled on it. In 1977, the Court
granted certiorari in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison. 182 Har-
dison, a clerk in the Stores Department of TWA's maintenance and
overhaul base, refused to work on his Sabbath after he embraced the
tenets of the Worldwide Church of God. Attempts at accommoda-
tion produced temporary success because, at the time, he had suffi-
cient seniority to avoid working on Saturday, his Sabbath.' 83 When
Hardison transferred to another job, 84 however, he lost his seniority
and problems arose. Because he no longer had sufficient seniority to
bid for Saturdays off, he had to work and the union refused to vio-
late the seniority system to give him the days off. TWA rejected a
four-day week proposal because it purportedly would impair critical
functions of the airline. Consequently, TWA discharged Hardison
who then brought a claim against TWA for religious discrimination.
The district court ruled in favor of TWA and the union, holding that
the union's duty to accommodate' 85 did not require it to ignore the
seniority system; that TWA had satisfied its reasonable accommoda-
tion obligation; t8 6 and that "the alternatives rejected by TWA would
have created an undue burden on TWA's business.' 87
The appellate court affirmed the judgment for the union but re-
versed as to TWA, holding that TWA had not satisfied its duty to
accommodate Hardison's religious needs. 88 The court held that an
employer may not merely accept the role of a Pontius Pilate, 89 but
must make an "effort to accommodate the employee's religious ob-
servances."'' g0 The court further held that the employer had the bur-
den of demonstrating undue hardship,' 9 ' and that TWA failed to
meet this burden because it had not even attempted to find volunteer
182. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
183. Id
184. Hardison transferred to obtain a daytime shift because he had recently married.
185. The district court found that the EEOC's regulation requires accommodation by la-
bor organizations, 375 F. Supp. at 882, and the court of appeals, in dicta, looked favorably on
this holding but did not rule on it specifically, 527 F.2d at 42-43. A union duty was found to
exist in McDaniel v. Essex International, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978).
186. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
187. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1975).
188. 527 F.2d 22.
189. Pontius Pilate merely "washed his hands" of the blood of Jesus Christ, Matthew
27:24.
190. 527 F.2d at 39. The employee's right to transfer must not be restricted by his reli-
gious beliefs and practices. Id "If Saturday work inevitably falls to the employees with low-
est seniority," TWA might be effectively precluded "from ever hiring those . .. whose
religious convictions preclude work from sundown on Friday until sundown on Saturday."
Id at 41-42 n.12.
191. Id at 40.
substitutes for Hardison. 92
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that TWA had made rea-
sonable efforts to accommodate. The Court held that TWA was
under no duty to arrange an exchange of shifts in contravention of
the union contracts, stating that absent "a clear and express indica-
tion from Congress. . .an agreed-upon seniority system [need not]
give way when necessary to accommodate religious observance."'
' 93
The Court reasoned that the seniority system represented a neutral
method of allocating the nonpreferred weekend work. If TWA
abandoned this system to give Hardison Saturdays off, it would de-
prive other employees of their agreed-upon work preference primar-
ily because they did not adhere to a religion that observed Saturday
as the Sabbath. The Court made it clear that Title VII does not con-
template such unequal treatment. "The repeated, unequivocal em-
phasis of both the language and the legislative history of Title VII is
on eliminating discrimination in employment, and such discrimina-
tion is proscribed when it is directed against majorities as well as
minorities."' 94 The Court elaborated:
It would be anomalous to conclude that by "reasonable ac-
commodation" Congress meant that an employer must deny the
shift and job preference of some employees, as well as deprive
them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or pre-
fer the religious needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII
does not require an employer to go that far.' 95
The Court buttressed this interpretation by citing section 703(h)
of Title VII, which immunizes certain otherwise prohibited differen-
tial treatment from Title VII attack when the differential treatment
occurs pursuant to a bona fide seniority system.'9 6 The Court con-
cluded that "absent a discriminatory purpose the operation of a sen-
iority system cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the
system has some discriminatory consequences." ''97 Because the sen-
iority system evidenced no discriminatory intent, the Court reasoned
that TWA did not engage in an unlawful employment practice when
it followed the dictates of its seniority system.
The Hardison Court further determined that Congress did not
intend that an employer bear more than a de minimis cost to accom-
modate the religious needs of its employees.19 8 Specifically, the
Court held that the reasonable accommodation rule does not require
192. Id at 42.
193. 432 U.S. at 79.
194. Id at 81.
195. Id
196. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). See also supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
197. 432 U.S. at 82.
198. Id at 84. The Court declared, "Itlo require TWA to bear more than a de minimis
cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship."
an employer to abridge a collective bargaining agreement, lose effi-
ciency in plant operation, or pay overtime wages in order to accom-
modate the religious beliefs of its employees. The Court felt
compelled to reach this result because any other interpretation
would give special treatment to the employee who practiced a minor-
ity faith, thus discriminating against those employees who did not
practice such a faith.199
Accordingly, the Supreme Court also rejected potential solu-
tions that, unlike shift trading, arguably would not have violated the
collective bargaining agreement. First, Hardison could have worked
a four-day week with a worker from another department substituting
for him on his Sabbath. Second, TWA could have replaced Hardi-
son on Saturday by paying premium wages to another employee.
The Supreme Court concluded that both solutions would have im-
posed an undue hardship on TWA, either because of the lost effi-
ciency resulting from understaffing other departments or because of
higher wage costs. The Court asserted that because the overriding
purpose of Title VII was to eliminate discrimination in employment,
the Court would not, in the absence of clear statutory language or
legislative history to the contrary, "construe the statute to require an
employer to discriminate against some employees in order to enable
others to observe their Sabbath.' '2°"
In a dissent highly critical of the majority's de minimis stan-
dard, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, argued that by
interpreting "undue hardship" as anything more than a de minimis
cost, the majority in essence had held
that although the EEOC regulations and the Act state that an
employer must make reasonable adjustments in his work demands
to take account of religious observances, the regulation and the
Act do not really mean what they say. An employer, the Court
concludes, need not grant even the most minor special privilege to
religious observers to enable them to follow their faith.
20 1
199. The Court asserted that, like the "abandonment of the seniority system, to require
TWA to bear additional costs when it did not incur such costs by giving other employees the
days off they wanted would involve unequal treatment of employees on the basis of their
religion. Id
200. Id at 85.
201. Id at 86-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall continued:
As a question of social policy, this result is deeply troubling, for a society that truly
values religious pluralism cannot compel adherents of minority religions to make the
cruel choice of surrendering their religion or their job. And as a matter of law to-
day's result is intolerable, for the Court adopts the very position that Congress ex-
pressly rejected in 1972, as if we were free to disregard congressional choices that a
majority of this Court think unwise.
Id Justice Marshall also questioned whether the cost involved in Hardison exceeded the de
minimis standard. He based this attitude on the lack of evidence in the record of loss of
efficiency, and on the fact that the amount of overtime involved amounted to less than $150 for
three months, when Hardison could have transferred back to his previous department and
regained his seniority. Id at 92 n.6.
Justice Marshall pointed out that allowing employers to reject
an accommodation simply because it involves preferential treatment
would render the EEOC regulation and the statute ineffective be-
cause, by definition, the accommodation issue arises only "when a
neutral rule of general applicability conflicts with the religious prac-
tices of a particular employee. 2 °2 To exempt the employee from the
rule "will always result in a privilege being 'allocated according to
religious beliefs'."2 3
The Supreme Court's decision in Hardison has significantly nar-
rowed the employer's duty to accommodate in two basic ways. First,
it has eliminated any accommodations that require virtually any ad-
ditional expenses in either money or lost operating efficiency. Sec-
ond, it has totally removed from consideration all accommodations
that would discriminate against other employees.
Hardison involves several distressing implications. First, the
Court seems to contradict the language of the reasonable accommo-
dation rule and the legislative history concerning the reach of the
rule to Sabbatarians. Second, the decision may discourage accom-
modation of religious beliefs because accommodation almost always
imposes greater than de minimis costs. Finally, the decision appar-
ently permits a collective bargaining agreement to determine the ex-
tent of the accommodation required of the employer.2°
The language of the reasonable accommodation rule indicates
that the employer's duty to reasonably accommodate an employee's
religious needs does not terminate when the accommodation would
require more than a de minimis expenditure. Congress adopted a
requirement of reasonable accommodation unless undue hardship,
not mere hardship, would result. The Court in Hardison equated
"undue hardship" with "more than a de minimis cost," a questiona-
ble interpretation given the ordinary usage of the words.205
In applying Hardison, courts probably will rarely find a senior-
ity system to be an independent source of religious discrimination in
the absence of discriminatory intent. Rather, seniority provisions in
202. Id. at 87.
203. Id at 88. As Justice Marshall pointed out, the majority's analysis would seem to not
require an accommodation even when no hardship would result, if the accommodation would
afford a privilege to some employees because of their religious beliefs. Id.
204. Recent cases on the closely related topic of religious refusal to pay union dues reveal
conflicting results. Two cases held that the employer must accommodate to the point of undue
hardship. McDaniel v. Essex International, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978); Cooper v. Gen-
eral Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908
(1977). One court held reasonable accommodation unconstitutional in light of the establish-
ment clause. Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal. 1977), a'don
other grounds, 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1980).
205. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 93 n.6 (1977) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Black's Law Dictionary defines undue as "more than necessary; not proper; ille-
gal .. " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1697 (4th ed. 1951).
collective bargaining agreements will serve to limit the types of ac-
commodation available to employers. An employer may thus con-
tract away his duty of reasonable accommodation by entering into a
valid collective bargaining agreement. The effect on the employee
whom the employer either discharged or did not hire because of his
beliefs, however, is no less substantial than if he had been the victim
of purposeful discrimination. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
demonstrated its unwillingness, absent an express statutory mandate,
to find that "an agreed upon seniority system must give way when
necessary to accommodate religious observances. 2 °6 The Hardison
Court emphasized that it would not order preferential treatment for
Sabbath observers without a more specific definition of the scope of
reasonable accommodation.20 7 Moreover, even if Congress should
amend Title VII to require employers and unions to violate collec-
tive bargaining agreements to accommodate employees' religious
needs, the Court may ultimately strike down the new provision be-
cause the Establishment Clause mandates that government maintain
its neutrality by affording religious and nonreligious employees simi-
lar treatment.
The decision in Hardison also implies that in showing undue
hardship the employer may consider, in addition to the accommoda-
tion in question, future accommodations he may have to make for
other employees with the same religious belief. This holding effec-
tively overrules much of the prior case law. Before Hardison, most
courts supported the idea that overtime pay constituted a proper
means of accommodation; they disagreed only on when the cost
would become an undue hardship. More importantly, even the most
liberal of these courts considered only the costs of accommodating
the individual employee.
By requiring the employer to bear only a de minimis cost and
allowing consideration of potential future accommodations in deter-
mining the cost, the Court has practically eliminated the duty to ac-
commodate. In any large enterprise the possibility exists that more
than one employee will belong to a particular faith or to another
faith that observes the same Sabbath. More importantly, other em-
ployees may possibly convert at a later date. Therefore, any decision
involving an accommodation for one employee must be premised on
the assumption that it will also apply to others.
The Court also apparently held that the employer's duty to ac-
commodate does not authorize discrimination against other employ-
ees, regardless of an undue hardship. This determination focuses on
the statutory requirement that the employer, not the fellow employ-
206. 432 U.S. at 79.
207. Id. at 85. See supra text accompanying note 199.
ees, make the accommodation. In so holding, the Court appears to
have disregarded the legislative history of the 1972 amendment to
Title VII, which contemplates unequal treatment of employees on
the basis of their religion by rearranging work schedules to allow
Sabbatarians time off from work to observe their Sabbath.2 °8 Con-
gress obviously recognized that accommodating some employees'
religious practices would result in unequal treatment to other
employees. 20 9
The Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the reasonable
accommodation requirement in Hardison deals an unfortunate blow
to religious freedom. Future decisions will determine, however,
whether Hardison is, as Justice Marshall portrayed it, a "fatal blow"
to all efforts to accommodate. The Court's construction seems to
leave reasonable accommodation more a rule of preference than a
requirement. The message to employers appears to be that if it is
possible to accommodate their employees' religious beliefs, then they
should do so. Further litigation will spell out the parameters of this
reinterpreted reasonable accommodation doctrine. Specifically, the
Court's vaguely defined "de minimis cost" rule will have to be ap-
plied as the undue hardship test has been, on a case-by-case basis.
Although some cases since Hardison have found undue hard-
ship or a failure to make a reasonable attempt to accommodate, 10
the lower courts uniformly understand Hardison to require little in
the way of accommodation before undue hardship results. The deci-
sion by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cummins v. Parker Seal
Company 211 most clearly exemplifies this understanding. In 1975,
this court had held that the employee's religious needs could be ac-
commodated by substitution and rescheduling of other employees,
and that the objections and complaints of fellow employees did not
constitute undue hardship. An equally divided Supreme Court af-
firmed the decision in 1976,212 but subsequently vacated it on rehear-
ing in 19772 3 and remanded it for further consideration in light of
Hardison. In a brief per curiam opinion, the court of appeals
208. 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972). Senator Randolph's remarks in proposing the 1972
amendment to Title VII, uncontradicted in subsequent debates, also support the proposition
that Congress intended to permit unequal treatment for the benefit of Sabbatarian employees.
209. Commonly, an exemption or privilege granted by Congress to one person or group
will result in a burden on other persons or groups. For example, excusing conscientious objec-
tors from military conscription effectively requires nonobjectors to serve instead. See, e.g.,
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918).
210. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979); Niederhuber v. Cam-
den County Vocational & Tech. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 498 F. Supp. 273 (D.N.J. 1980);
Padon v. White, 465 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Kenny v. Ambulatory Centre of Miami,
400 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. App. 1981).
211. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975).
212. 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
213. 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
stated 21 4 that Hardison required affirmance of the judgment of the
district court, which had held that any further attempt by the em-
ployer to accommodate would cause undue hardship. Recent cases
in several circuits, 215 and in the state courts,21 6 seemingly apply this
rather undemanding approach.
Hardison left several questions unanswered. One question con-
cerns the extent to which the Hardison decision applies to unions as
distinguished from employers. Even though the union in that case
technically prevailed in the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
granted its petition for certiorari because the lower court decision
had assumed that the union should be required to waive the collec-
tive bargaining agreement to accommodate Hardison.2 7 The Court
did not, however, explicitly discuss the union's duties, stating merely
that "since we reverse the judgment against TWA, we do not pursue
the union's status in the Court. '218 This language suggests that the
holding applies to unions as well as employers.2'9 Apparently, un-
ions are relieved from (or burdened with) the same accommodation
duty as employers.
Another unanswered question concerns whether the protection
of vested seniority rights extends to other collective bargaining pro-
visions. The Hardison Court premised its protection of seniority
rights on the two following grounds: that section 703(h) expressly
requires intentional discrimination to render the application of a
seniority system an unfair employment practice and that accommo-
dation would require inequality of treatment of employees. Thus,
whether this provision extends to other terms of collective bargain-
ing agreements absent the specific statutory language of section
703(h) that is directed only to seniority provisions remains unclear.
Nevertheless, because the Court applied its equality-of-treatment ap-
proach in considering alternate accommodations not regulated by an
agreement, any term included in a collective bargaining agreement
that would produce unequal treatment may be protected from the
reasonable accommodation requirement.22 °
214. 561 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1977).
215. Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hosp., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 907 (5th Cir.
1982); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 560 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1977); Jordan v. North
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977); Huston v. Local 93, UAW, 559 F.2d 477 (8th
Cir. 1977).
216. Olin Corp. v. The Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 67 Ill. 2d 466, 367 N.E.2d
1267 (1977).
217. 432 U.S. at 70-71 n.5.
218. Id
219. This conclusion is further bolstered by courts holding that other provisions of Title
VII apply to unions. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d at 42.
220. The agency shop clause, found in many collective bargaining agreements, that re-
quires each employee to contribute to the union, illustrates such a provision. The courts have
found these provisions to conflict with strictly held religious views barring support of labor
VI. Constitutional Implications
A. Does the Reasonable Accommodation Rule Violate the
Establishment Clause?
While the Hardison Court chose not to determine the constitu-
tionality of the reasonable accommodation rule, the dissent, in a
brief discussion, asserted that
the constitutionality of the statute is not placed in serious doubt
simply because it sometimes requires an exemption from a work
rule. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly found no Establishment
Clause problems in execpting religious observers from state-im-
posed duties, even when the exemption was in no way compelled
by the Free Exercise Clause.22'
Despite Justice Marshall's assurance, however, arguably the rule
does violate the Establishment Clause.
The first amendment commands that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion. '2 22 The first amend-
ment also commands that "[Congress shall make no law] prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion]. ' ' 223 There exists a tension between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. As Justice
Brennan articulated this tension: "There are certain practices con-
ceivably violative of the Establishment Clause, the striking down of
which might seriously interfere with certain religious liberties also
protected by the First Amendment. 224
The exemptions and privileges granted to resolve direct and in-
direct conflicts between law and religion theoretically raise questions
involving both religion clauses. When the law that creates the con-
flict derives historically from or parallels a religious rule (e.g., Sun-
day closing), enforcement of the religiously colored law arguably
violates the Establishment Clause. Similarly, when employers grant
a conflict-resolving exemption, but limit it to certain individuals, the
unions. See, e.g., Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 928 (1975).
221. 432 U.S. 63, 90 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
222. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. Most Establishment Clause challenges reviewed by the Court
in recent years have dealt with education--either state aid to private education or prayer in the
public schools. In 1947, Everson v. Board of Educ., 339 U.S. 1 (1947), began a flood of educa-
tion cases that is yet. to abate. The Court in Everson upheld the validity of state reimbursement
for bus fare to parents of private school students. Id. at 17.
Before 1947, only a few Establishment Clause cases reached the Court, and the only re-
curring theme in those cases perhaps was the principle that the state cannot interfere in or act
to solve religious disputes, even to determine ownership rights in property. See, e.g., Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 679 (1871) (civil courts cannot decide which of two rival factions has
the right to operate a local church); Terrett v. Tyler, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815) (courts
cannot dissolve a religious corporation and distribute its assets).
223. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
224. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). For a discussion of the conflict between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause, see also Schwartz, No Imposition of Religion. The Establishment Clause Value, 77
YALE L.J, 692 (1968).
limitation arguably constitutes an establishment of religion.225 In
conflict cases, however, the courts tend to focus on the Free Exercise
Clause while paying little or no attention to the Establishment
Clause.
Often, as in Hardison, the courts never reach the constitutional
question because they resolve the cases on the issues of reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship. Most courts that have ruled
on the constitutional question have upheld the constitutionality of
section 2000e(j). 226 In analyzing the constitutional issue, the courts
have generally applied a three-pronged test set forth in Committeefor
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist 227 as follows:
(1) Does the statute in question reflect a clearly secular legislative
purpose?228 (2) Does the statute have a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion? 229 and (3) Does the statute avoid ex-
cessive governmental entanglement with religion?
23 °
1. Secular Purpose. -To satisfy the test's "clearly secular legis-
lative purpose" requirement, a law must be "adequately supported
by legitimate, nonsectarian state interests."'23  The legislative history
of section 2000e(j) may be construed to indicate that it fails this test.
Section 2000e(j) began as an amendment to the Equal Employment
Opportunities Act of 1971. Its sponsors intended the bill to have an
exclusively religious character in that it required employers to
remain flexible in establishing work schedules for employees who
practice a Sabbatarian religion. Thus, section 2000e(j)'s avowed
purpose consisted of forcing the government to abandon its neutral
stance with regard to some religious practitioners.232
225. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). In other cases, though theo-
retically a claim for exemption on religious grounds involves an establishment of religion, the
Court has focused, and presumably will continue to focus, on the Free Exercise Clause. See,
e.g., In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
226. Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir.
1981); Tooley v. Martin Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
671 (1982); Nottleson v. Smith Steel Workers, 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 587 (]982); Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975);
Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 432
U.S. 63 (1977); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 433 U.S. 903 (1977); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1972);
Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank,
399 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. (1977). Con-
ira Gavin v. People's Natural Gas Co., 464 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1979), vacated, 613 F.2d
482 (3d Cir. 1980); Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal. 1977), ap d
on other grounds, 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1980).
227. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
228. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
229. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 664 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
230. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
231. Committee of Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
232. In proposing the amendment, Senator Jennings Randolph, section 2000e(j)'s primary
Despite its avowed support of religion, defenders of section
2000e(j) could argue its constitutionality by the supposition of two
"secular primary purposes:" that Congress passed it to strengthen
the prohibition of discrimination found elsewhere in the Civil Rights
Act, and that Congress intended its passage to effectuate the Free
Exercise Clause of the Constitution. Section 2000e(j), however,
seems to mandate discrimination rather than cure it. It "requires an
overt preference for the religious beliefs of certain employees ...
even if [the] accommodation [of their beliefs] is detrimental to other
employees." '233 To accommodate a Sabbatarian's religiously pre-
scribed work schedule, for example, other employees may have to
work one more weekend day. While such an accommodation could
legally comprise a part of a private agreement between an employer
and its employees, the Establishment Clause, enforced through the
primary effect test, seems to forbid the government from passing
laws mandating any such arrangement that favors one set of
believers.
Further, a court apparently cannot follow the example of the
draft cases and interpret section 2000e(j) in a nondiscriminatory
manner.234 Although an atheist or agnostic may hold secularly
based beliefs that are as strongly opposed to war as some religious
beliefs, no secular practice that might conflict with a given work
schedule can be treated as a nonreligious equivalent to mandatory
observance of the Sabbath. Because they lack religious practices to
accommodate, nonbelievers do not enjoy the protection of section
2000e(j) and must bear the burden of flexible work schedules. Thus,
section 2000e(j) seems to possess the unconstitutional primary pur-
pose of advancing religion.
sponsor, specified that he felt the Sabbatarian faiths--Orthodox Jews, Seventh Day Advent-
ists, and Seventh Day Baptists-would benefit from the bill, estimating total membership of
these faiths at about 1.18 million people throughout the United States. His comments were
quite partisan:.
[T]here has been a partial refusal at times on the part of employers to hire or to
continue in employment employees whose religious practices rigidly require them to
refrain from work in the nature of hire on particular days. So there has been, be-
cause of understandable pressures, such as commitments of a family nature and
otherwise, a dwindling of the membership of some of the religious organizations be-
cause of the situation to which I have just directed attention.
My own pastor in this area. . . has expressed his concern and distress that there
are certain faiths that are having a very difficult time, especially with the younger
people, and understandably so, with reference to a possible inability of employers on
some occasions to adjust work schedules to fit the requirements of the faith of some
of their workers.
118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972).
233. Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782, 790 (S.D.
Cal. 1980), 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry
Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975).
vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
234. Welsh v. United States, 388 U.S. 333 (1979).
Senator Randolph's purpose in adding the section, however,
should not by itself invalidate the amendment.235 While the lack of
a secular legislative purpose theoretically invalidates a statute, the
Supreme Court has seldom relied on the legislative purpose to strike
down a challenged law, but rather has seemingly indulged every pre-
sumption of a proper legislative purpose. In the Sunday closing law
cases, 236 for example, the Court upheld the validity of the legislative
purpose because it provided for a uniform day of rest. 23 7 The Court
has even recognized several programs to aid nonpublic schools, al-
though held unconstitutional on other grounds, as having valid secu-
lar purposes, e.g., advancement of secular education, promotion of
pluralism and diversity, concern about overcrowding in public
schools should nonpublic schools fail, and preservation of a safe and
healthy educational environment for all schoolchildren.238 Only the
prohibition against teaching the theory of evolution in Epperson v.
Arkansas239 and the prayer in public schools in.Abing/on School Dis-
trict v. Schempp24° fell because of an impermissible legislative pur-
pose. This general judicial deference, compounded by the
uncertainty of the other legislators' intentions, makes it doubtful that
Senator Randolph's intention standing alone would necessitate the
invalidation of the law.24'
2. Primary Effect. -The second part of the Nyquist test re-
quires that the statute's primary effect neither advance nor inhibit
235. Senator Randolph's purpose becomes less clear, however, because he also said:
The term "religion" as used in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses, as I
understand it, the same concepts as are included in the first amendment - not merely
belief, but also, conduct; the freedom to believe, and also the freedom to act.
I think in the Civil Rights Act we thus intended to protect the same rights in
private employment as the Constitution protects in Federal, State or local
governments.
118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972).
In the brief debate, Senator Williams (N.J.) added: "In dealing with the free exercise
thereof, really, this promotes the constitutional demand in that regard." Id at 706.
236. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market,
366 U.S. 617 (1961).
237. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 448 (1961). The Court reached this conclusion
in spite of the historical connection between Sunday closing laws and religious observances,
and the fact that one section of the law was cloaked in terms of "profan[ing] the Lord's day."
Id The Court noted that legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it coincides or
harmonizes "with the tenets of some or all religions," so long as temporal reasons "wholly
apart from any religious considerations" support such legislation. Id at 442.
238. Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
239. 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968).
240. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
241. The court in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 553 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated,
433 U.S. 903 (1977), speaking of section 2000e(j), stated that "the argument of one Senator that
the proposed legislation would assist a particular pastor and religious group does not require
the conclusion that Congress enacted the legislation to promote and support a particular reli-
gion." Id.
religion. Although seemingly straightforward, primary effect repre-
sents the most elusive concept of the three parts of the Nyquist test.
Its limits do not expressly appear anywhere. Analyzing the Supreme
Court's applications of the primary effect requirement through the
years, however, helps define its dimensions.
Two clear principles emerge. First, the state may not directly
support religious activity. In the public schools, for example, prayers
and devotional Bible-reading, even if voluntary, may not comprise
part of the curriculum because of their inherently religious nature.242
The second principle, however, provides that an incidental benefit
does not signify a per se constitutional violation.
Arguably, the government through the reasonable accommoda-
tion rule is sanctioning those religions which demand that followers
not work at certain times. The religion itself may benefit in the form
of higher attendance at services and a corresponding increase in the
contents of the collection plate. Athiests find themselves the most
disadvantaged. Those who believe in a Sunday Sabbath could assert
the provision to escape working on Sundays, but atheists may not
avail themselves of the amendment at all.24 3 Because the statute dis-
advantages nonbelievers, and benefits only a small number of reli-
gious groups, the courts could declare the statute unconstitutional as
fostering religious beliefs. 2 "
Applying these principles, if the reasonable accommodation
rule requires an employer to vary from the terms of a facially neutral
collective bargaining agreement to accommodate an employee's reli-
gious observances when other employees who do not claim religious
exemption do not enjoy similar treatment, then the statute prefers
religion over nonreligion. Therefore, if courts interpret section
2000e(j) and the reasonable accommodation rule to require preferen-
tial treatment of religious employees, the primary effect will advance
religion, and violate the first amendment mandate of government
242. In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1963). the Court consid-
ered two companion cases and reviewed laws requiring the reading of Bible verses and the
recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the beginning of each school day in the public schools of
Pennsylvania and Baltimore. Although proponents defended the laws in each instance as
moral education and the study of literature, the Court noted the "pervading religious charac-
ter" of such exercises and invalidated each law.
243. An employee may have very strong nonreligious reasons for not wanting to work on
Saturday. For example, poor health may restrict a person to a shorter week, or restrictions
may prevent a divorced parent from visiting a child on all but a certain day of the week.
244. Based on United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970), an atheist should enjoy the same protection as those who hold religious
beliefs. Yet this is rarely the case. Only one case has allowed an atheist to avail herself of the
amendment. In Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975). the court
determined an atheist to be constructively discharged for failing to attend monthly meetings as
required by her employer. She did not attend because the meetings always began with a
prayer and the employer refused to permit her to arrive late. This case represents an anomaly
unlikely to occur often. The primary purpose of the amendment was to aid Sabbatarian be-
fiefs and to date that has been its overwhelming use.
neutrality. The Hardison Court recognized the problem. In holding
that Title VII does not "require an employer to discriminate against
some employees in order to enable others to observe their Sab-
bath," '245 the majority recognized the potential unconstitutionality of
the reasonable accommodation requirement.246
Some incidental benefit to religion, however, does not necessar-
ily render the statute unconstitutional. In McGowan v. Maryland, 
2 47
the Court determined that while the original purpose of Sunday clos-
ing laws had been to aid religion, those laws had acquired a valid
secular purpose. 248 Although Sunday closing laws continue to bene-
fit religion with a Sunday Sabbath, the benefit was permissible be-
cause it was only an incidental effect of otherwise desirable, secular
legislation.249
In Anderson v. General Dynamics,250 the court ruled that section
2000e(j) violated the primary-effect part of the Nyquist test, because
the law constituted "a preconceived and direct benefit to particular
religions. "251 The court continued, "[t]he accommodation require-
ment discriminates between religion and nonreligion by favoring
only those employees with 'religious' beliefs. In addition, the re-
quirement discriminates among religions by favoring only those be-
liefs which require modification of an employer's work rules.
'252
Arguably, however, any benefit to religion conferred by section
2000e(j) is as incidental as the benefit conferred in the Sunday clos-
ing law cases. Neither religious activity nor religious institutions en-
joy direct sponsorship or subsidization; rather, the purpose and
primary effect of the legislation is to inhibit discrimination. Further-
more, as the first Cummins v. Parker Seal Co. 213 appellate decision
noted in finding the statute constitutional, a Sabbatarian freed from
work on Saturday because of his employer's accommodation may or
may not attend church; likewise, he may or may not contribute to the
collection. Thus, any benefit flowing to religion from the accommo-
245. 432 U.S. at 85.
246. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, also acknowledged that a constitutional problem
would exist if the statute were construed to require employers to assume significant costs to aid
the religious observer. 432 U.S. at 90.
247. 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (McGowan was the Nyquis Court's example of permissible ad-
vancement of religion).
248. The Court traced the history of Sunday closing laws from thirteenth century England
to present-day America. Id at 421-39. Nonreligious reasons for the laws expressly emerged in
the eighteenth century. Id at 433-34.
249. Id at 445. The Court added: "To say that the states cannot prescribe Sunday as a
day of rest. . . solely because centuries ago such laws had their genesis in religion would give
a constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare rather than one of mere separa-
tion of church and State." Id.
250. Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782, 790 (S.D.
Cal. 1980), rev'd, 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981).
251. 489 F. Supp. at 790.
252. Id
253. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), vacaled, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
dation bears only an incidental relationship to section 2000e(j). 254
3. Excessive Entanglement. -The third part of the Nyquist test
requires that the statute avoid excessive governmental entanglement
with religion. Potentially, any claim for accommodation under Title
VII may involve a judicial or administrative inquiry into the "reli-
gious" quality of the claimed belief or practice. The court in Gavin v.
People's Natural Gas Company255 concluded that such an inquiry did
involve excessive entanglement and thus conflicted with the Estab-
lishment Clause. The court also analyzed two possible methods of
avoiding this problem, but concluded that the result of the case
would not change. First, the term religion could be defined to in-
clude anything an employee considers religious.256 The court ob-
jected to such an expansive definition of religion because it would
create havoc in the workplace. Additionally, "such a reading [could]
create due process problems for employers who would have no way
of implementing such a broad and vague scheme wherein they [are]
charged with an affirmative duty to accommodate." '257 Second, the
court could decide that the employee's belief did not constitute reli-
gion as a matter of law.258 However, the court believed that this
determination would require interpreting the statute to protect only
common religious beliefs and such a narrow interpretation would
raise serious Establishment Clause objections. 259 The Gavin court
ultimately refused to decide whether or not the employee's belief was
religious2 60 because of the serious constitutional issues inherent in
such a determination.
A majority of the court in Cummins v. Parker Seal Company26'
found no such difficulty with the entanglement question, noting that
determining the sincerity of an employee's religious beliefs would
not require any more governmental involvement than a state deter-
mination of a purported church's eligibility for a property tax
exemption.2 62
254. 516 F.2d at 553.
255. 464 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir.
1980).





260. Id at 633. The court consequently dismissed the complaint.
261. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
262. Id at 554, (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-76 (1970)). The court
explained: "[Tihe EEOC and the courts will have to determine simply whether the employer
has made a reasonable accommodation and whether any undue hardship will result. These
issues will be considered in the labor relations context, and their resolution certainly does not
necessitate any government entanglement with religion." Id at 553-54.
B. Establishment vs. Free Exercise
Over the years, courts have "struggled to find a neutral course
between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute
terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would
tend to clash with the other.' '263 In spite of the absolute prohibitions
of the clauses, the Supreme Court has recognized that
this Nation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separa-
tion between Church and State. It has never been thought either
possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation, and,
consequently, cases arising under these Clauses have presented
some of the most perplexing questions to come before this
Court.
2 6 4
With total separation considered impossible, the government
must sometimes accommodate religious interests despite the Estab-
lishment Clause. The argument that section 2000e(j) implements the
Free Exercise Clause and that protection of the free exercise interests
outweighs the statute's favoritism both toward religions requiring ac-
commodation and also toward believers in general may cure the Es-
tablishment Clause defects in section 2000e(j). The Supreme Court
has taken this approach in approving governmental accommoda-
tions and benefits based on religion when the result has been an ex-
clusive benefit to religion. These accommodations and benefits
survived Court scrutiny because, while the government must avoid
promoting religion, it must also not inhibit it. For example, in Sher-
bert v. Verner, 265 a woman was denied unemployment compensation
on the ground that she failed to accept suitable work. In fact, em-
ployers would not hire her because of her refusal, on religious
grounds, to work on Saturday. The Court found that providing her
with the unemployment benefits would not foster the establishment
of her religion, but denying her the compensation would violate her
right of free exercise.266
While a plausible attack can be made on the constitutionality of
section 2000e(j), it is equally reasonable to argue that the section
263. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
264. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973). The Court has also
explained:. "Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and
religious organizations is inevitable." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). See also
Stanmeyer, Free Exercise and the Wall. The Obsolescence of a Metaphor, 37 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 223 (1968).
265. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
266. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Members of the Amish sect were
convicted of violating a Wisconsin law compelling attendance at school until age sixteen. The
Amish defendants, claiming their religion prohibited high school attendance, refused to send
their children to high school. The Court found that, although "the danger that an exception
from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the establish-
ment clause" could not be ignored, Wisconsin's law impinged upon the free exercise of the
Amish religion. Id at 220-21.
protects the free exercise of religion and does not "establish" reli-
gion. As the Supreme Court stated in Walz v. Tax Commission.
267
"[Flor the men who wrote the religion clauses ...the 'establish-
ment' of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and ac-
tive involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. '268 Clearly
the reasonable accommodation rule requires no sponsorship or
financial support, the "primary evil" at which the Establishment
Clause was aimed,269 or active involvement of the government in
religion.
VII. Conclusion
The different interpretations of "undue hardship" by the Sixth
Circuit in Cummins I and by the Supreme Court in Hardison illus-
trate a sharp contrast. The Sixth Circuit in Cummins I showed a
deference to employees and set forth a strenuous standard for em-
ployers to meet. With respect to the complaints of other employees,
the court indicated that only evidence of "chaotic personnel
problems" would establish undue hardship.270 Derived from dicta in
Dewey,27 approved by the EEOC 2 72 and adhered to by the Sixth
Circuit subsequent to Cummins z,273 this exacting standard has never
been met. With the Hardison decision and its interpretation of un-
due hardship as anything more than de minimis costs, the Sixth Cir-
cuit's standard will not likely be applied again. The de minimis cost
interpretation cuts harshly against the employee because an em-
ployer apparently must no longer expend much effort to accommo-
date. In effect, the Court has interpreted "undue" out of "undue
hardship." The two cases taken together evince a significant shift in
emphasis from the rights of religious employees, as depicted in Cum-
mins I, to the prerogatives of employers and employees 274 who do
not request accommodation, as illustrated in Hardison.
Several questions remain to confront employers concerning
their obligations under section 2OOe(j). Although the Hardison
Court delineated what is not required, it failed to clarify how an
employer must comply with the statute. Clearly, an employer cannot
267. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
268.. Id at 668.
269. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
270. 516 F.2d at 550.
271. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 339 (6th Cir. 1970), af'd per curiam by
an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
272. EEOC Dec. No. 6310 (1971). EEOC Dec. No. 6202 (1970).
273. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 1975).
274. In many cases, other employees, not the employer, suffer undue hardship. One such
example is the employee who waited for many years to acquire sufficient seniority to avoid
weekend work, and now must work weekends because of someone else's religious beliefs.
refuse to make any effort on the employee's behalf.27 5 Any negoti-
ated accommodation that results in no greater employment benefits
in the aggregate for the religious employee should prevail. For ex-
ample, TWA allowed Hardison his religious holidays off in return
for his working on days that constituted religious holidays for other
employees. This accommodation imposed no burden to the em-
ployer or the other employees that would violate the inequality of
treatment restriction even though it theoretically gave Hardison spe-
cial treatment on the basis of his religion. In addition, the employer
may have to incur some minimal costs, but the costs should not rise
to the level of financing an additional day off for an employee be-
cause of his religious requirements. In sum, an employer must
shoulder only minimal burdens in an effort to accommodate.
Hardison seems to reflect a strong underlying concern regarding
the constitutionality of the duty to accommodate religious beliefs in
employment. The Hardison Court may, in effect, have adopted the
Cummins dissent which argued that, to be constitutional, accommo-
dation must carry little meaning in employment decisions. Thus,
while the Hardison Court accepted the existence of the employer's
duty to accommodate, the Court directed that duty toward maintain-
ing employer neutrality rather than toward conferring employee
privilege. Nevertheless, by deciding Hardison on statutory grounds,
the Court left the basic constitutional question unanswered. Given
the past demonstrations of congressional willingness to expand Title
VII protections for nontraditional Sabbatarians, the Court may have
to address this question in the future if Congress acts to "correct" the
Court's statutory interpretations.
The exercise of religion represents one of the fundamental liber-
ties Americans enjoy. On the other hand, the employment relation-
ship constitutes one of the most important parts of any working
American's life. For the great majority of people who worship on
Sunday, these two important aspects of life do not conflict, for Sun-
day is the "working man's" as well as the "religious man's" day off.
But for employees who do not worship on Sunday,276 the two con-
flict, and these persons must choose between religion and employ-
ment. As a matter of fairness to such employees, accommodating
their religious beliefs does no more than grant them the same privi-
leges enjoyed by others. Any resulting inconvenience to others
would most often, if not always, be outweighed by the hardship on
the employee seeking accommodation if the employer fails to
accommodate.
275. See Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Jordan v. North
Carolina Nat. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C. 1975), 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977).
276. The employment relationship and religion also clash for those employees who seek
any other kind of religious accommodation.
